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THE  BATTLE  OF  MEGIDDO 


A  DISSERTATION 

SUBMITTED  TO   THE   FACULTY 

OF  THE  GRADUATE  SCHOOL  OF  ARTb  AND  LITERATURE 

IN  CANDIDACY  FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF 

DOCTOR  OF  niiLOSornY 

DEPARTMENT  OF  ORIENTAL  LANG'^AGF.S     ND  LITERATURES 


BY 


HAROLD  HAYDEN  NELSON 


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Private  Edition,  Distributed  By 

THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  LIBRARIES 

CHICAGO,  ILLINOIS 

1913 


EXCHANGE 


View  VI. — General  i)iinoraina  of  the  battlefield  taken  from  Knoll  F  looking  northwest 


Ube  TUnirermtp  ot  CbicaQO 


THE  BATTLE  OF  MEGIDDO 


A  DISSERTATION 

SUBMITTED  TO   THE  FACULTY 

OF    THE    GRADUATE   SCHOOL   OF   ARTS   AND   LITERATURE 

IN   CANDIDACY   FOR    THE   DEGREE    OF 

DOCTOR    OF   PHILOSOPHY 

DEPARTMENT  OF  ORIENTAL  LANGUAGES  AND  LITERATURES 


BY 

HAROLD  HAYDEN  NELSON 


Private  Edition,  Distributed  By 

THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  LIBRARIES 

CHICAGO,  ILLINOIS 

1913 


XTbe  illnirersitp  of  Cbtcago 


THE  BATTLE  OF  MEGIDDO 


A  DISSERTATION 

SUBMITTED   TO   THE   FACULTY 

OF   THE    GRADUATE   SCHOOL   OF    ARTS   AND   LITERATURE 

IN    CANDIDACY   FOR    THE   DEGREE   OF 

DOCTOR   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

DEPARTMENT  OF  ORIENTAL  LANGUAGES  AND  LITERATURES 


BY 

HAROLD  HAYDEN  NELSON 


Private  Edition,  Distributed  By 

THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  LIBRARIES 

CHICAGO,  ILLINOIS 

1913 


^x: 


PREFACE 

The  text  of  this  study  was  prepared  and  printed  before  the  war,  but 
owing  to  the  fact  that  I  was  confined  behind  the  Turkish  fines  in  Syria 
durirg  the  whole  of  the  war,  it  was  impossible  to  secure  the  cuts  of  the 
illustrations  and  maps  till  some  time  after  the  conclusion  of  hostilities. 
Meanwhile  the  photographs  had  suffered  from  the  lapse  of  time  and  an 
effort  to  secure  new  ones  in  the  summer  of  1920  failed  owing  to  the  stupidity 
of  certain  Syrian  auto-drivers.  But  the  photograi)hs,  such  as  they  are.  will 
nevertheless  serve  to  illustrate  the  text. 

Had  the  University  of  Chicago  regulations  governing  the  publication  of 
theses  permitted,  I  would  gladly  have  rewritten  the  whole  manuscript  in  the 
light  of  the  recent  campaign  of  the  Eg>'ptian  Expeditionar\'  Force  under 
Lord  AUenby  in  the  same  region  in  which  Thutmose  III,  nearly  3,500  years 
earUer,  also  defeated  an  enemy  advancing  from  the  north  toward  Egj^pt. 
There  are  certain  interesting  and  striking  parallels  and  contrasts  between  the 
strategy'  of  the  earliest  and  of  the  latest  victorious  commanders  of  campaigns 
in  central  Palestine. 

This  study  is  confined  almost  entirely  to  an  effort  to  interpret  the  Annals 
of  Thutmose  III  in  the  light  of  the  geography  of  the  environs  of  Megiddo. 
I  have  entered  into  no  philological  discussion,  although  such  points  were 
thoroughly  considered  in  preparation  of  the  translation  of  the  Annals.  I 
regret  that  1  am  unable  to  incorporate  certain  material  bearing  on  the  sub- 
ject of  this  study  which  has  appeared  since  the  text  was  printed  in  Beirut, 
Syria,  in  1913,  and  also  that  I  cannot  make  use  of  certain  valuable  suggestions 
made  by  those  who  campaigned  in  Palestine  in  1917-18.  A  number  of  typo- 
graphical errors  have  crept  into  the  text  which  were  unavoidable  under  the 

circumstances  in  which  it  was  printed. 

Hauold  11.  Nelson 


461758 


■KGHAKSS 


THE  BATTLE  OF  MEGIDDO 


INTRODUCTION 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  on  May  15th,  1479  B.C.  between  the  Egyptians 
under  Thutmose  III  and  the  allied  forces  of  the  Syrian  states  is  the  first 
battle  in  history  which  we  can  study  in  any  detail.  Most  of  the  ancient 
oriental  accounts  of  battles  are  mere  statements  of  the  forces  engaged 
and  of  the  outcome  of  the  conflicts.  Among  the  Egyptian  records,  how- 
ever, there  are  preserved  in  considerable  detail  the  narratives  of  two  or 
three  engagements  from  which  we  can  gather,  with  greater  or  less 
clearness,  the  general  plan  of  each  battle,  the  disposition  of  the  troops 
and  the  manoeuvres  of  the  opposing  armies.'  So  far  these  battles  have 
been  studied  either  without  reference  to  the  topography  of  the  battle- 
fields, or  with  insufficient  data  regarding  the  physical  features  of  the 
area  of  operations  and  the  bearing  they  must  have  had  on  the  course  of 
the  engagement.  In  the  following  discussion  of  the  Battle  of  Megiddo  it 
has  been  my  endeavor  to  interpret  the  scanty  records  of  the  conflict 
preserved  in  hieroglyphic  in  the  light  of  the  topography  of  the  region, 
which  I  studied  on  two  visits  to  the  battlefield  in  the  summers  of  1909 
and  1912.  On  those  two  occasions  I  made  a  series  of  surveys  and  took  a 
number  of  photographs  which  are  here  reproduced.  They  include  a  suf- 
ficient number  of  views  to  bear  out  my  observations  on  the  topography 
which  are  contained  in  the  text  of  this  discussion.  I  have  used  as  the 
basis  of  my  plan  of  the  battlefield  the  excellent  map  in  Schumacher's 
Tell  el-Mutesellim,  Band  II,  adding  myself  certain  details  not  found  on 
the  original,  especially  the  configuration  of  the  hills  to  the  west  and 

I    Besides    the  Battle    of  Megiddo,  compare,   for  the  Battle   of  Kadesh,  Breasted,  Battle  of 
Kadeih,  and  for  the  siege  of  Memphis  by  Piankhi  see  Breasted,  /Incient  Records,   IV,    857-865. 


2  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 

south  of  Megiddo,  and  verifying  most  of  the  altitudes  found  on  Schu- 
macher's map.  In  this  connection  I  wish  to  thank  for  their  assistance 
my  colleagues.  Dr.  Harvey  Porter,  of  Beirut,  Syria,  who  visited  Megiddo 
with  me  in  1909,  and  especially  Professor  Alfred  H.  Joy,  also  of  Beirut, 
who  was  with  me  in  1912,  without  whose  assistance  my  work  would 
have  been  attended  with  great  difficulty  and  delay. 

In  the  introduction  to  his  "Antike  Schlachtfelder  in  Griechenland" 
Kromayer  says: 

"Wenn  es  in  der  modernen  Kriegsgeschichte  von  je  her  als  unerlassliche  Voraus- 
sctzung  fiir  die  Erkenntnis  gegolten  hat,  dass  den  Schilderungen  der  Feldziige 
und  Schlachten  Kartcn  und  Plane  beigefiigt  seien,  so  muss  man  sich  wundern, 
dass  man  bei  der  Behandlung  antiker  Schlachten  so  lange  Zeit  geglaubt  hat, 
dieses  Hilfsmittel  cntbehren  und  auch  ohne  dasselbe  zu  einem  leidlichen  Ver- 
standnisse  kommen  zu  konnen. 

"Es  braucht  ja  vor  Leutcn,  die  auch  nur  ein  ganz  klein  wenig  mit  den  Beding- 
ungen  dieses  Studiums  bekannt  sind,  eigentlich  gar  nicht  mehr  ausgesproch- 
en  zu  werden,  dass  selbst  die  genaucste  und  lebendigste  Schilderung  solcher 
Ereignisse  fur  sich  allein  tot  und  unanschaulich  bleibt,  dass  ein  Blick  aut"  eine 
gute  Karte  mehr  gibt  als  stundenlanges  Studium  oft  nur  irrtumveranlassender 
Beschreibungen. " 

I  have  quoted  at  such  length  from  Kromayer  on  account  of  the  impor- 
tance, as  it  seems  to  me,  of  his  position  on  the  study  of  military  history 
in  its  application  to  oriental  military  movements,  a  position  which  can- 
not be  too  much  emphasized  and  which,  if  adopted  by  some  oriental  his- 
torians, would  have  prevented  many  of  the  impossibilities  in  the  inter- 
pretation of  ancient  historical  inscriptions  which  are  now  found  in  some 
of  the  current  histories.  It  has  been  my  effort  in  the  following  study  to 
take  Kromayer's  position  throughout.  I  have  consulted  the  discussions 
of  the  battle  contained  in  the  chief  histories,  those  of  Breasted,  Brugsch, 
Budge,  Hall,  Maspero,  Meyer,  Petrie  and  Wiedemann,  and  have  also 
made  use  of  Schumacher's  topographical  and  archaeological  studies  in 
MuNDPV  and  in  his  Tell-el-Mutesellim.  The  chronology  of  the 
campaign  is  that  of  Breasted,  as  presented  in  his  Ancient  Records,  II, 
409,  which  is  based  on  his  studies  in  AZ,  37,  123  ff.  and  39,  60-68.  For  a 
bibliography  of  the  older  publications  of  the  hieroglyphic  sources  the 
reader  is  referred  to  Breasted's  Ancient  Records,  II,  391,  note  a.  The  pre- 
sent study  is  based  on  the  text  of  the  Annals  of  Thutmoselll  in  Sethe's 
Urkunden  der  18.  Dynastie,  pp.  647-667,  with  a  few  changes  and  omis- 
sions where  Sethe's  text  is  entirely  a  restoration  by  the  editor.    I  have 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  3 

also  taken  into  account  such  other  references  to  the  battle  as  may  be 
found  in  the  Eighteenth  Dynasty  inscriptions,  all  of  which  are  publish- 
ed in  Sethe's  Urkunden. 

At  this  point  I  wish  to  acknowledge  my  great  indebtedness  to  Pro- 
fessor Breasted,  from  whom  I  have  received  constant  encouragement  and 
continued  and  most  valuable  suggestions.  Any  acknowledgment  of 
the  help  and  inspiration  derived  from  his  stimulating  teaching  is,  at 
best,  inadequate.  Since  the  appearance  of  his  Ancient  Records  any  one 
who  attempts  to  deal  with  historical  subjects  in  the  Egyptian  field  must 
consciously  or  unconsciously  appropriate  much  from  that  valuable  mine 
of  information.  Though  the  translation  of  the  Annals  appearing  in  the 
Records  is  based  on  an  inferior  text  to  the  one  I  have  been  able  to  use 
(as  the  Urkunden  did  not  appear  till  after  the  Records  were  already  out), 
nevertheless  T  have  drawn  much  assistance  from  Dr.  Breasted's  transla- 
tion, in  some  cases  even  adopting  his  very  words  where  I  felt  there  was 
ho  reason  for  changing  them.  Many  of  the  variations  from  his  translation 
Dr.  Breasted  would  himself  incorporate  in  substance  into  a  new  edition 
of  the  Records. 

I  wish  also  to  thank  my  colleague  in  Professor  Breasted's  seminar, 
Mr.  George  Allen,  who  has  made  several  helpful  suggestions  on  doubt- 
ful passages  in  the  text. 


Thk  Battle  of  Mkoiddo 


I 

THE  TOPOGRAPHY  OF  THE  AREA  OF  OPERATIONS 
THE   ANNALS,   LINES   6-13 

Urk.  647  Year  22,  month  four  of  the  second  season,  day  25;  [his  Majes- 
ty was  in  the  fortress  of]2  (7)  Tharu  on  the  first  victorious 
campaign  [to  repulse  the   invaders]-'  (8)  of  the   boundaries   of 

Urk.  648  Egypt,  in  valor,  [in  victory,  in  might,  in  triumph.] 

(9)  Now  it  was  a  [long]  time  [that  they  ruled  this  land  which 
was  in]  (10)  disturbance.  Every  man  was  working  for  [their 
princes  who  were  in  Avaris.]  (11)  It  came  to  pass  at  a  later 
time  that  the  garrison  which  had  been  there  (12)  were  in  the 
city  of  Sharuhen. 
They  were  from  Yeraza  (13)  to  the  Marshes  of  the  Earth* 

2.  Sethe  would  read  "his  Majesty  passed  by  the  fortess  of."  However,  the  usual  restor- 
ation, as  I  have  given  it,  seems  to  fill  the  lacuna  as  well  and  agrees  with  the  formula  usual  through- 
out the  Annals.    For  the  restoration  cf.   Rouge,  Iriscr.    iter.    207. 

3.  Sethe,  "Neue  Spuren  der  Hyksos  in  Inschriften  der  18.  Dynastic,"  ./4Z,  p.  73  FT,  sup- 
ports this  restoration  of  the  Urkunden,  but  the  use  of  the  rare  word  tki'zv,  "invaders",  seems  too 
definite  to  be  accepted. 

4.  Sethe,  op.  cit.,  p.  84,  translates  the  passage  "von  Jrd  bis  zu  den  Enden  der 
Erde".  This  phrase,  "From  Yaraza  to  the  Marshes  of  the  Earth,"  Breasted,  Atuierit  Records,  II, 
416,  noted,  interprets  as  meaning  "from  northwestern  Judea  to  beyond  the  Euphrates."  This  also 
seems  to  be  the  meaning  given  by  IVliiller,  j4.  und  E.,  p.  281  ff.  Maspero,  Recueil,  II,  p.  50, 
translates  the  passage  "  a  partir  de  la  ville  de  leraza,  jusqu'aux  regions  lointaines  de  la  terre". 
On  the  other  hand,  Hall,  Anc.  Hist,  of  the  Near  East,  p.  234,  note  i,  says,  "This  does 
not  mean  the  country  from  Northwestern  fudea  to  beyond  the  Euphrates,  as  Breasted 
thinks,  but  to  the  Serbonian  bog  and  Lake  Menzala. "  That  the  term,  "Marshes 
of  the  Earth",  was  originally  applied  to  the  marshes  of  the  Delta  is  most  likely  and  thus 
it  came  to  signify  the  extreme  north  as  known  to  the  Egyptian  of  the  prehistoric  period.  As, 
however,  the  Egyptian  frontier  was  pushed  over  into  Asia  and  geographical  knowledge  extended, 
the  old  term  came  to  be  applie.1  to  the  Naharin  region,  which  was  then  the  northern  Imiit  of 
Egyptian  geography.  Hall,  on  page  234,  translates  the  passage  under  discussion,  "from  Yeraza 
to  the  marshes  of  Egypt",  in  which  lie  renders  t'  as  "Egypt",  a  rather  unjustifiable  liberty 
with  the  meaning  ot  the  word  which  prejudges  the  question.  That  the  term  "marshes" 
would  apply  aptly  to  the  plains  ot  northern  Syria,  at  least  in  the  rainv  winter  and  early  summer, 
is  evident  to  any  traveller  who  has  tried  to  make  his  way  across  the  wide  stretches  of  flooded 
land  around  Aleppo  at  that  time  of  year.  "The  Marshes  of  Asia"  are  constantly  referred  to  in 
the  historical  inscriptions;  see  /Indent  Records,  II,  120,  321,  38^,  402;  III,  118.  Agiin, 
"the  Marshes  of  Naharin"  occurs  in  Ancient  Records,  II,  631,  and  III,  I  18.  "Marshes"  is 
syniinvinoiis  wirli   Mir.inni  in   Ancicm  Records,   II,  659.    In  Ancient  Records,   III,  480  we  have  re- 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  5 

when  they  began  to^  revolt  against  his  Majesty. ^ 

Year  23,  first  month  of  the  third  season,  day  4;  day  of  the 
feast  of  the  royal  coronation;  (14)  at  the  city  of  "Which-the 
-prince-seized",  Gaza  [is  its  name  in  Kharu.]' 

[Year  23,]  (15)  first  month  of  the  third  season,  day  5;   depar- 
ture from  this  place  in  valor,   [in  victory,]   (16)   in   might,   in 
triumph,  to  overthrow  that   wretched  foe  and   to  extend   (17) 
[Jrk.  649  the  boundaries  of  Egypt,  according   to  that   which   his   father, 

Amon,  commanded (18)  he  seize. 

Year  23,  first  month  of  the  third  season,  day  16;  at  the  city 
of  Yehem. 

When  Thutmose  III  at  last  became  sole  ruler  of  Egypt  after  the  death 
of  his  queen  Hatshepsut,  about  1480  B.C.,  he  found  himself  confronted 
with  a  dangerous  situation  in  his  Asiatic  provinces.  The  remnants  of 
the  Hyksos  power,  driven  from  Egypt  a  hundred  years  earlier  by 
Ahmose  I,  and  since  brought  into  subjection  to  Egypt  by  Amenhotep  I 
and  Thutmose  I,  had  taken  advantage  of  the  military  inactivity  of 
Hatshepsut's  supremacy  to  combine  for  a  last  struggle  with  the  ex- 
panding power  of  Egypt.8  The  center  of  the  movemen  t  seems  to  have 
been  the  King  of  Kadesh  on  the  Orontes.  Under  his  leadership  the  dy- 
nasts  of  Syria-Palestine   united   and   their  combined  forces   advanced 

ference  miide  to  the  "marshlands"  (plu)  as  being  the  extreme  limit  of  the  world,  therefore  not 
of  Egypt.  Again  in  Ancient  Records,  11,  loi,  657;  III,  434,  "iVIarshes"  is  clearly  used  to  re- 
fer to  countries  remote  from  Eiiypt  in  northern  Syria.  It  is  strange  if  in  this  passage  alone  among 
historical  inscriptions  "the  Marshes  of  the  Earth"  (not  "Egypt")  should  be  used  of  Egypt, 
especially  when  the  writer  is  speaking  of  a  revolt,  the  center  of  which  was  in  the  north  at 
Kadesii,  and  the  members  of  which  included  "every  chief  of  every  northern  country."  [Urk. 
IV,  660,  7). 

5.  The  idiom  ■zi;'  r  in  this  passage  is  of  uncertain  meaning.  Breasted,  PSBA,  23,  239  ff.,  sug- 
gests the  translation  "to  be  about  to,  to  begin".  The  latest  discussion,  that  in  Gardiner,  Admo- 
nititns,  p.  53,  suggests  that  the  "notion  of  a  logical  development  in  a  wrong  direction,  is  present 
in  a  greater  or  less  degree".  In  titling  der  K.  P.  Akademte,  XXXIX,  p.  51,  Erman  gives  the 
meaning  as  "sich  anschickt-n  zu",  on  the  basis  of  the  Berlin  Dictionary  material.  None  of  these 
explanation  seems  to  entirely  fit  all  the  cases.  I  have  adopted  Erman 's  rendition  as  nearly  as  pos- 
ible,  adapting  the  idea  to  the  exegences  of  translation  where  necessary. 

6.  The  translation  as  given  above  is  based  on  Sethe's  reconstruction,  of>.  cit.,  pp,  73-86.  The 
restoration  of  such  words  as  "Avaris",  however,  is  altogether  too  daring  to  serve  as  a  basis  for  sei- 
entific  conclusions.  As  it  does  not  prejudice  in  any  way  the  results  of  the  present  study,  I  give  the 
passage  in  full. 

7.  So  Sethe.     Equals    "is  its  Palestinian  name"-   a  very  doubtful  restoration. 

8.  For  the  latest  evidence  of  the  identity  of  the  Asiatic  opponants  of  Thutmose  III  with  the 
Hyksos,  see  Sethe's  reconstruction  of  the  text  of  the  Annals,  o/>.  cit. 


6  .  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 

southward  to  the  Plain  of  Esdraelon  to  meet  the  advance  of  Thutmose 
III  who  was  bent  on  bringing  the  rebellious  states  again  under  Egyptian 
control.  In  the  22nd  year  of  his  reign,  on  the  25th  day  of  the  8th  month 
(April  19th,  1479  B.C.),  Thutmose  marched  out  of  Egypt  at  the  frontier 
fortress  of  Tharu  9  on  his  eastern  border  and  lead  his  army  towards 
Palestine.  Just  how  large  his  forces  were  it  is  impossible  to  say,  though 
we  may  be  certain  that  they  comprised  not  more  than  15,000  to  20,000 
men,  while  10,000  would  probably  not  be  underestimating  their 
numbers. '0  The  Asiatics  certainly  did  not  outnumber  the  Egyptians, 
and  we  may  therefore  place  the  contending  forces  at  between  10,000 
and  15,000  men  each.  Of  these  a  portion  was  chariotry  and  the  re- 
mainder infantry,  armed  for  the  most  part  with  bows  and  spears.  The 
sword  was  as  yet  almost,  if  not  entirely,  unknown  in  oriental  warfare, 
probably  not  coming  into  use  in  the  East  till  the  introduction  of  Sherden 
mercenaries,  who  first  appear  under  Amenhotep  III."'  Each  chariot 
held  two  men,  the  driver  and  an  archer.  The  Hittites  later  were  accus- 
tomed to  use  three  men  to  a  chariot,  but  we  have  no  evidence  that  the 
Asiatics  at  this  time  used  more  than  two  men.  The  effectiveness  of  the 
chariot  depended  on  the  skill  of  the  archer  and  on  the  demoralization 
wrought  among  the  enemy  by  the  charge  of  the  chariots  into  their 
ranks. 

On  the  4th  day  of  the  9th  month  (April  28th),  Thutmose  was  in 
Gaza,  the  first  important  place  he  met  in  Palestine.  12  On  the  16th  of  the 
month  (May  19th)  he  reached  Yehem,  where  he  seems  to  have  come  in- 
to touch  with  the  enemy  for  the  first  time.  Just  where  this  city  lay  is 
open  to  question.  It  must  have  been  located  on  the  coast  plain  near  the 
southern  slope  of  the  Carmel  Ridge,  for,  first,  it  was  at  or  near  the  junc- 
tion of  three  roads  that  led  across  the  Ridge  into  the  Plain  of  Esdraelon, 
and  the  only  three  roads  that  thus  cross  the  Ridge  meet  on  the  coast 
plain  at  the  foot  of  the  Ridge  not  far  from  Tellel-Asawir  (see  Map  I);  and, 
second,   it  lay  so   near  the  Ridge   that  when   the  army  marched  out  of 

9  For  location  of  Tharu  see    Kiithmann,     Die  Ostg'tnze  j4e^\ptens,  pp.  33-46, 

10  For  a  discussion  of  the  available  material  on  the  size  of   Egyptian   armies    see     Breasted, 
Baltic  of  Kadesh,  pp,  8-n. 

11  Knudtzon,   El-Amarna   Tafeln,    122. 

12  On  the  importance  of  Gaza  and  its  neighborhood  from  a  military  standpoint  see  Olmstead, 
Sargon  of  Auyria,  p.  62  ff.  Also  Hartmann  "Die  Strasse  Von  Damaskus  nach  Kairo" 
ZDMG,  64,     p.  668. 


V 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo 


^ehen  on  May  13th,  the  troops  had  already  assumed  the  pecuUar  forma- 
tion necessitated  by  the  mountain  defile,  13  but  which  would  have  been 
entirely  unnecessary  on  the  open  coast  plain.  Near  the  spot  where  the 
three  roads  meet  is  located  the  modern  village  of  Yemma,  which  Petrie 
has  identified  with  Thutmose's  halting  place.i'*  Although  the  identifica- 
tion is  little  more  than  guesswork,  still  Yehem  must  have  lain  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Yemma,  and  may  be  provisionally  located  near  that 
spot. 

Any  army  approaching  Syria  from  the  south  along  the  coast  road 
encounters  just  beyond  Yehem  the  first  natural  barrier  to  its  advance. 
The  ridge  of  hills,  shooting  off  from  the  highlands  of  Ephraim,  running 
from  southeast  to  northwest  and  terminating  at  the  seaward  end  in  Mt. 
Carmel,  cuts  through  the  coast  plain  and  offers  a  natural  bulwark  of 
defence  to  southern  Syria. '^  The  Ridge,  stretching  out  for  eighteen  or 
nineteen  miles,  runs  along  the  southern  edge  of  the  Plain  of  Esdraelon. 
It  is  crossed  in  two  places  by  roads  which  apparently  have,  since  the 
beginning  of  history,  serves  as  highways  of  commerce  for  the  caravans 
passing  back  and  forth  from  Egypt  to  Mesopotamia.  The  Ridge  itself 
falls  naturally  into  two  parts,  the  northern  section,  which  forms  Mt. 
Carmel,  and  the  southern  end,  known  first  as  Belad  er-Ruhah  and 
further  south  as  Umm  el-Khataf  and  Umm  el-Fahm.'6  The  sides  of  Mt. 
Carmel  itself  rise  so  steeply  from  the  plain,  especially  on  the  north,  that 
nothing  but  the  roughest  and  steepest  footpath  can  cross  it.  At  its 
highest  point  it  attains  an  altitude  of  1,800  feet,  while  at  its  southern 
extremity,  just  above  the  road  from  Tell  Kaimun  to  Tell  el-Asawir,  it 
is  still  some  1,000  feet  above  the  sea.  No  hostile  army,  nor  indeed  peace- 
ful caravan,  can  climb  its  rocky  eastern  side.  In  order  to  reach  the  north 
of  Carmel,  an    army  approaching  from  the  south  must  either  go  around 


13.  Urk.,  IV,  652. 

14.  Hist,  of  Egypt,  II,  p.327.  Cf.  Miiller,  MVAG,  1907,  I,p.22.  M»i^ao,  Struggle  of 
the  Nations,  p. 2 5 7,  note  I,  puts  Yehem  at  el-Kheimeh  (following  F.  de  Saulcy).  Hall,  Arte. 
Hist,  of  the  Near  East,p.  235,  suggests  that  the  town  probably  lay  in  the  present  Wady  Yah- 
mur,  a  small  wady  in  the  low  hills  south  ot  'Ar'arah. 

15.  The  following  description  of  this  region  is  drawn  from  my  own  notes,  as  well  as  from 
the  numerous  accounts  of  this  district  which  have  been  published  by  travellers. 

16.  For  lack  of  any  other  designation  I  shall  speak  of  this  whole  range  of  hills,  including 
Carmel,  BelSd  er-RQhah,  Umm  el-Fahm  and  Umm  el-Khataf,  as  the  Carmel  Ridge,  distin- 
guishing it  thus  from  Mt.  Carmel  proper,  which  forms  its  northern  end. 


8  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 

the  northern  end  by  the  site  of  the  modern  city  of  Haifa  on  the  sea,  the 
road  usually  followed  by  the  crusading  and  other  armies  coming  along 
the  coast  plain,  or  must  pass  around  the  southern  end  either  by  the  road 
already  referred  to,  running  from  Tell  el-Asawir  to  Tell  Kaimun,  or  by 
the  road  through  Subbarin  and  down  the  Wady  Milh  to  Tell  Kaimun. 

The  remaining  two-thirds  of  the  Ridge  keeps  along  at  a  moderate 
height  of  from  800  to  1,500  feet  above  the  sea  level.  As  seen  from 
across  the  Plain  of  Esdraelon,  the  northern  section  of  the  Ridge  ,known  as 
Belad  er-Ruhah,  between  Carmel  proper  and  Umm  el-Fahm,  is  re- 
markably even  in  height,  and  is  lower  than  either  extremity  of  the 
Ridge.  The  two  roads,  to  which  I  later  refer  as  the  first  road  and  the 
third  road,  cross  the  Ridge  at  either  end  of  this  middle  section.  The 
northern  side,  which  abuts  directly  upon  the  Plain  of  Esdraelon,  is  fairly 
steep  and  rocky  and  to-day  is  almost  totally  devoid  of  verdure.  To  the 
traveller  following  the  road  from  Haifa  to  Jenin  along  the  northern  base 
of  the  hills  this  Ridge  presents  a  most  inhospitable  and  forbidding  ap- 
pearance. There  are  to-day  only  a  very  few  scantily  populated  villages 
between  the  seaward  end  of  the  plain  and  Tell  el-Mutesellim.  The  in- 
habitants of  these  villages  draw  their  livelihood  from  the  cultivation  of 
the  plain,  and  there  are  no  signs  of  vineyards  and  groves  on  the  hills 
themselves.  This  portion  of  the  Ridge  repels  any  advance  of  population 
from  the  plain,  while  its  desolate  appearance  seems  to  accentuate  the 
difiRculty  of  crossing  it  presented  by  its  barren,  rocky  slopes. 

Between  Tell  el-Mutesellim  and  Jenin  the  hills  assume  a  more  pleas- 
ing aspect  and  several  fairly  prosperous  villages  are  scattered  along 
their  base.  But  these  villages  also  turn  rather  towards  the  plain  than 
towards  the  hills,  which  here  rise  to  a  considerable  height  in  the  re- 
gion of  Umm  el-Khntaf  and  Umm  el-Fahm. 

The  southern  slope  is,  for  the  most  part,  much  more  gradual,  rising 
gently  out  of  the  coast  plain,  and  is  covered  with  a  fair  growth  of 
trees,  the  evident  remains  of  much  more  extensive  forests.  The  water- 
shed lies  well  to  the  north  side  of  the  Ridge,  so  that,  while  this  line  of 
hills  seems  to  offer  an  obstacle  to  an  enemy  approaching  it  from  the  north, 
it,  on  the  other  hand,  rises  so  gradually  from  the  plain  on  the  south  that, 
to  a  vigorous  commander  approaching  from  that  direct'on,  it  ni'ght  seem 
to  present  but  little  impediment  to  an  advance.      While  several   hostile 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  9 

armies  have  crossed  the  Ridge  from  south  to  north,'''  few,  if  any,  have 
assayed  it  from  north  to  south.  Those  invaders  from  the  north  who 
have  not  taken  the  coast  road  around  the  northern  end  of  Carmel,  have 
avoided  the  dangers  of  the  nari-ow  passes  by  following  the  more  open 
and  less  difficult  road  around  the  southern  end  by  Jenin,  through  the 
Plain  of  'Arrabeh  to  Baka  or  Zeita. 

To  cross  the  Ridge  two  roads  start  from  Tell  el-Asawir.'^  The  one 
runs  almost  due  north  to  Tell  Kaimun,  while  the  second,  starting 
slightly  northeast,  bifurcates  at  'Ain  'Arah,  one  branch  reaching  the 
Plain  of  Esdraelon  at  Tell  el-Aghbarlyeh,  and  the  second  branch  at  Tell 
el-Mutesellim.  For  conveniance  of  designation  and  to  avoid  confusion 
I  shall  speak  of  these  roads  as  the  first  roads  (Tell  Kaimiln  to  Tell  el- 
Asawir),  the  second  road  (Tell  el-  Aghbariyeh  to  'Ain  'Arah),  the  third 
road  (Tell  el-Mutesellim  to  Tell  el-Asawir),  and  the /o«r^/i  road  (Je- 
nin, the  Plain  of  'Arrabeh  to  Baka  or  Zeita).  There  are  one  or  two  rough 
paths  that  cross  at  other  places,  serving  to  connect  the  various  villages 
scattered  along  the  Ridge,  but  none  of  them  shows  Evidence  of  ever  hav- 
ing been  an  ancient  highway,  nor  would  they  offer  an  opportunity  for  an 
army  to  cross  the  hills.  A  study  of  Map  I  will  show  that  these  four 
roads  occupy  the  only  passes  over  the  Ridge,  so  that,  in  ancient  as  in 
modern  times,  they  served  as  the  only  regular  lines  of  communication 
between  the  coast  plain  and  the  Plain  of  Esdraelon. 

The  first  road,  though  fairly  easy  of  ascent  on  the  southern  slope  oi 
the  Ridge,  is  yet  steep  at  the  northern  extremity.  It  does  not  connect  at 
the  northern  end  with  any  highway  to  the  northeast,  but  leads  rather 
into  the  Phoenician  Plain  than  into  the  Plain  of  Esdraelon. '^ 

For  the  moment  I  shall  pass  over  the  second  road,  which  debouches  in- 
to the  great  plain  st  Tell  el -Aghbariyeh,  and  shall  consider  in  some  de- 

17.  These  include  Thutmose  III,  Pharaoh  Necho,  and  Napoleon.  It  is  interesting,  how- 
ever, that  Napoleon  in  his  retreat  kept  to  the  sea  road  around  the  northern  end  of  Carmel. 

18.  Schumacher,  "Die  Aegyp.  Hauptstrasse  von  der  Ebene  Sharon  zur  Ebene  Jezreel," 
MuNDPy,  1903,  p.  4. 

19.  There  is  still  another  road  north  of  the  first  loaJ,  which,  however,  is  really  a  branch 
oi  the  first  road  for  it  starts  from  Tell  Kaimn  and  branching  off  from  the  main  road  to  the 
right,  ascends  the  Wady  Milh  and  so  on  by  Subbarn  to  the  plain.  As  the  northern  end  ofthis 
road  reaches  Esdra?lon  at  the  same  spot  as  does  the  first  road,  for  the  purpose  of  this  discussion 
it  may  be  regarded  as  offering  the  same  advantages  or  disadvantages  as  does  the  latter  road.  I  have 
therefore  not  taken  it  up  in  detail,  but  consider  that  the  arguments  applied  to  the  first  road 
apply   equally  well  to  it. 


10  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 

tail  the  third    and    most    important  of  the  roads  that   cross  the   Ridge, 
that  running  from  Tell  el-As^wir  to  Tell  el-Mutesellim. 

At  the  spot  where  the  road  from  Tell  el-Mutesellim  and  that  from 
Tell  Kaimun  meet  was  once  a  stronghold,  to-dav  marked  by  the  con- 
siderable mound  of  Tell  el-Asawir,  which,  together  with  a  possible 
settlement  on  the  site  of  the  village  of  ez-Zebadne^o  opposite,  controlled 
the  junction  of  these  two  important  commercial  highways.  Starting 
from  Tell  el-Asawir,  the  road  enters  the  Wady  'Arab,  which  is  there 
one  half  to  three  quarters  of  a  mile  wide  and  is  flat  and  open.  There  are 
evident  traces  of  an  old  Roman  road  that  once  led  through  the  wady. 
About  four  miles  above  Tell  el-Asawir  lies  'Ain  'Arab,  the  first  of  se- 
veral springs  that  are  scattered  along  the  way  (see  View  I).  In  fact,  be- 
tween this  point  and  the  outlet  of  the  road  near  Tell  el-Mutesellim,  a 
distance  of  about  nine  miles,  there  are  five  or  six  good  springs  and  wells 
and  several  smaller  sources  of  water.  It  is  by  far  the  best  provided  in 
this  respect  of  any  of  the  roads  that  cross  the  Ridge.  At  'Ain  'Arab, 
where  the  modern  village  of  'Arab  stands,  there  was  once  a  fortress 
which,  with  'Ar'arah  on  the  other  side  of  the  wady,  commanded  the 
junction  of  the  road  from  Tell  el- Aghbariyeh  with  that  from  Tell  el- 
Mutesellim.  Up  to,  and  i  slightly  beyond,  the  point  where  this  road 
branches  off,  the  wady  remains  open  to  a  width  of  from  a  third  to  half  a 
mile  and  with  its  excellent  water  supply  offers  abundant  camping 
ground  for  an  army  of  ten  or  fifteen  thousand  men  preparing  to  cross 
the  Ridge  by  either  of  the  two  roads  (see  View  II).  In  fact,  all  the  way 
from  Tell  el-Asawir  to  a  quarter  of  a  mile  above  'Ar'arah  the  valley  is 
wide  and  level  and  is  even  cultivated  some  way  up  the  slopes  on  either 
hand.  In  the  spring  of  the  year — the  season  at  which  I  crossed  this  pass 
— when  the  grain  is  yet  green,  the  prospect  that  meets  the  traveller's 
eye  as  he  enters  this  wady  is  most  pleasing.  The  ascent,  moreover,  is 
so  gradual  as  to  be  scarcely  perceptible  and  it  is  possible  to  drive  a  car- 


20.  Also  apparently  known  locally  as  Wady   'Arab 

21.  This  Tell  is  generally  so  designated  both  on  the  English  Survey  Map  and  in  accounts 
of  the  region.  Schumacher,  MuNDPf^,  1903,  p.  5,  in  a  very  careful  and  detailed  account  of 
the  region,  speaks  of  it  as  "Tell  es-Samra."  There  is  undoubtedly  a  "Shirbet  es-Samra"  at  that 
point,  buf  my  own  inquiries  in  the  neighborhood  as  to  the  name  of  the  Tell  seemed  to  show  no 
unanimity  of  opinion  on  the  part  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  district.  1  have  therefore  adhered  to 
the  name  Tell  el-Asiwir 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo        .  11 

riage  even  as  far  as  the  top  of  the  pass  at  Ain  Ibrahim. 22  The  latter  part 
of  the  ascent,  from  above  'Ain  'Arab  to  the  head  of  the  pass,  is  more 
narrow,  contracting  in  places  to  a  hundred  yards  or  so.  Just  before  the 
top  is  reached,  a  rough  donkey-path  turns  off  to  the  right  and  winds  up 
the  hillside  to  the  village  of  Umni  el-Fahm,  a  notorious  haunt  of  highway- 
men, which  nestles  above  in  a  theatre  of  hills  opening  to  the  northwegt. 
The  top  of  the  pass  near  Ain  Ibrahim  is  about  1,200  feet  above  the 
sea,  making  a  total  rise  from  'Ain  'Arab  of  only  about  750  feet  in  approx- 
imately six  miles.  Throughout  its  length  at  intervals  appear  remains 
of  the  ancient  Roman  road,  with  here  and  there  a  milestone  either  in  situ 
or  lying  nei^r  by.  At  'Ain  Ibrahim  the  valley  opens  out  to  two  hundred 
yards  or  so,  as  if  to  offer  a  halting  place  to  the  caravans  before  they 
enter  upon  the  more  abrupt  descent  on  the  northern  side  of  the  Ridge 
From  the  top  of  the  pass  the  road  gradually  descends,  passing  the  vil- 
lage of  Masmiis  and  winding  about  among  the  hills  (see  View  III).  It 
continues  to  decline  for  about  a  mile  and  a  half,  sinking  some  three  hun- 
dred feet  below  the  top  of  the  pass.  At  this  point  the  main  valley  turns 
to  the  right  and  reaches  the  plain  a  little  to  the  south  of  Megiddo.  It, 
however,  is  exceedingly  narrow  and  rough  and  from  its  very  formation 
could  never  have  been  used  as  a  road,  a  conclusion  which  is  strengthen- 
ed by  the  fact  that  its  opening  is  not  marked  by  any  settlement.  When 
the  road  reaches  the  point  where  the  valley  makes  this  sudden  turn,  it 
continues  straight  on  up  a  slight  rise  of  about  a  hundred  feet  and  then 
descends  alonga  smaller  wady  (see  View  IV).  This  latter  gradually  con- 
tracts as  it  proceeds  till,  about  half  a  mile  above  the  mouth  of  the  val- 
ley, it  reaches  its  narrowest  point,  being  not  more  than  ten  yards  wide. 
A  little  further  on  the  road  takes  a  sudden  turn  and,  opening  out  rapid- 
ly to  a  couple  of  hundred  yards,  it  emerges  upon  the  plain  of  Lejjun 
(see  View- V).  The  opening  of  the  valley  is  of  sufficient  width  to  allow 
a  body  of  several  thousand  troops  to  assemble  within  it  without  having 
to  overflow  into  the  plain  beyond.  The  road  from  'Ain  Ibrahim  to  the 
opening  of  the  valley  is  about  three  miles  long  and  descends  within  that 
distance  some  six  hundred  and  fifty  feet,  so  that  the  descent  on  the 
north  side  is  much  steeper  than  is  the  ascent  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Ridge.  Throughout  the  ascent  on  the  south  the  road  runs  along  the  floor 

22.    I  myself  have  gone  by  carriage  to  nearly  a  mile  above  'Ar'arah. 


12  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 

of  the  wady  which  is  almost  level  (see  View  II).  On  the  north  of  'Ain 
Ibrahim,  however,  it  is  narrower  and  the  bottom  is  therefore  worn  by 
the  winter  torrents  which  make  it  impassable  as  a  road  bed.  The  road 
here  keeps  some  fifty  feet  up  the  slope  on  the  west  side  of  the  wady, 
and  for  this  reason  is  much  rougher  and  narrower,  not  being  capable  in 
many  places  of  accommodating  more  than  two  travellers  abreast.  The 
contrast  between  the  ascent  on  the  south  and  the  descent  on  the  north 
is  therefore  marked.  The  hills  on  either  side  slope  down  gradually  to- 
wards the  bottom  of  the  valley  (see  View  III).  Of  course  such  a  road 
could  be  easily  defended  by  a  comparatively  small  number  of  men,  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  an  invading  army  could  readily  keep  possession  of 
the  hills  on  either  hand  which  are  neither  steep  nor  high  above  the 
valley.  Nowhere,  till  a  few  hundred  yards  from  the  mouth  of  the  pass, 
can  a  sight  of  Tell  el-Mutesellim  or  its  immediate  surroundings  be  ob- 
tained by  any  one  descending  from  'Ain  Ibrahim,  though  a  watcher 
posted  on  the  hill  above  Lejjun  could  descry  an  approaching  army  at 
least  a  mile  above  the  mouth  of  the  pass. 

The  second  road,  thatw^hich  runs  from  'Ain  'Arab  to  Tell  ol-Aghbari- 
yeh,  is  a  more  difficult  and  less  used  road  than  the  one  to  Tell  el-Mutesel- 
lim. It  is  merely  a  rough  mule-path  totally  different  from  the  third 
road  with  which  it  connects.  It  rises  "400  feet  in  5  miles  towards  the 
watershed  of  Belad  er-Ruhah.  It  passes  by  the  old  ruined  Khan  of  el- 
Mawiyeh  and  through  Kefrein,  descending  thence  some  500  feet  in 
3  miles"23  and  reaches  the  plain  at  Tell  el-Aghbariyeh.  It  was  once 
perhaps  the  main  line  to  Nazareth,  but  has  been  abandoned,  as  it  cross- 
es the  Kishon  at  a  spot  where  there  are  some  dangerous  pools.  It  now 
serves  principally  for  the  villages  along  its  course. 

Around  the  southern  end  of  the  Carmel  Ridge  runs  the  fourth  road 
from  ez-Zeita  to  Jenin  by  way  of  the  Plain  of  'Arrabeh,  which  through- 
out the  history  of  this  region  has  served  as  an  alternate  route  with  that 
starting  from  Tell  el-Mutesellim  for  the  caravans  coming  down  from 
Damascus  to  the  coast  plain.  24  This  road  is  less  shut  in  than  are  those 
through  the  heart  of  the  Ridge,  and  to  an  invading  army  desirous  of 
reaching  the  Plain  of  Esdraelon,  it  offers  a  more  secure  passage.    Only  on 

23.  Suifey  of  fVeitern  FaJestine,   11,  p  50. 

24.  Hartmann,   ZDMG,  64,  pp.   665  ff. 


The  Battle  of  Megtddo  13 

one  side  do  the  hills  threaten  the  road.  It  enters  the  hills  by  the  Wady 
el-Ghamik  and  then  passes  along  the  Plain  of  'Arrabeh  near  Dothan, 
descending  by  the  Wady  Belameh  to  Jenin.  The  highest  point  is  only 
800  feet  above  sea  level  and  the  steepest  gradient  extends  over  about  four 
miles  of  the  way,  where  the  rise  is  less  than  100  feet  per  mile.  In  winter 
this  is  the  usual  road  for  travellers  on  horseback,  as  the  third  road  where 
it  crosses  Esdraelon  is  impassable  in  winter. ^s 

Skirting  the  southern  edge  of  the  Plain  of  Esdrtelon  under  the  shadow 
of  the  Ridge  itself  runs  an  old  road  that  has  served  to  connect  the  cities 
on  the  southern  edge  of  the  plain.  Along  its  course  it  cuts  through  the 
various  roads  that  cross  the  plain.  At  each  such  junction  there  stood  in 
ancient  times  a  fortified  city,  which  thus  guarded  the  entrance  to  its 
respective  pass  and  controlled  the  commerce  passing  along  the  road.  The 
entrance  to  the  first  road  was  guarded  by  the  city  that  stood  on  Tell 
Keimiin.  This  spot  probably  marks  the  site  of  Jokneam26  and  by  its 
relations  both  to  the  mountain  pass  and  to  the  opening  of  the  Plain  of 
Esdraelon  towards  Acre  must  have  early  risen  to  considerable  import- 
ance. At  the  mouth  of  the  second  road  lies  Tell  el-Aghbariyeh,27  once 
the  site  of  an  ancient  stronghold.  Tell  el-Mutesellim,  the  spot  where 
Megiddooncestood,28  guards  the  entrance  to  the  third  road.  Later  this 
site  was  abandoned  in  favor  of  Lejjun,  about  a  mile  away,  directly  at 
the  mouth  of  the  pass  through  which  the  third  road  crosses  the  Ridge. 

25.  SurirY  of  fVeitern  Palestine,   II.  p.    50. 

26.  Robinson,  Later  Bib.  Resean/ies,  p.  114.  Eric.  Bib  under  Jokneam.  Swz'ey  0/ 
ff^estern  Palatine,  II,  48,  says  that  it  was  "possibly  the  Cyamon  of  Judith  (VII  3).  The 
place  is  mentioned  under  it<  modern  name  in  the  Samaritan  Book  of  Joshua.  John  of  Wirtz- 
burg  (iioo)  calls  it  Cain  Mens,  8  miles  from  Nazareth,  near  Carmel;  iMarino  Sanuto  (  1321) 
says  that  Cain  was  here  killed  by  an  arrow  by  Lamech,  and  marks  the  place  on  his  map  in  the 
position  of  Keimun.  Tetellus  (1130)  makes  Kains  Mons  10  miles  from  Acre,  3  miles  from 
Carmel,  and  speaks  of  a  fountain  at  its  foot  where  Cain  was  killed.  In  the  'Onomasticon'  it  is 
called  Cimona,  and  placed  6  Roman  miles  from  Legio,  on  the  way  to  Ptolemais."  During  the 
Crusades  the  fortress  of  Caymont  occupied  this  site,  and  formed  the  center  of  one  of  the  smaller 
Latin  fiefs. 

27.  Dr.  E.  Graf  von  Miilinen,  MuNDPV,  1908,  p.  40,  states  that  at  this  spot  are  two 
groups  of  houses  which'  are  called  "gliubajja"  which  the  Survey  Map  erroneously  calls  "aghba- 
riyeh." 

28.  G.  A.  Smith,  Hist.  Geog.,  pp.  386  ff.,  gives  the  evidence  for  the  identification  of  the 
location  of  Megiddo  as  follows:  "At  the  base  of  the  central  plain,  just  opposite  Jezreel,  is  a  place 
called  Leijun — the  Roman  Legio,  Legion,  at  the  mouth  of  the  chief  pass  towards  Sharon.  It 
was,  therefore,  as  important  a  site  as  Jezreel,  and  as  likely  to  give  its  name  to  the  plain.  In 
Roman  times  it  did  so.  Jerome  calls  the  great  plain  both  the  Plains  of  Megiddo  and  the  Campus 
Legionis.  Moreover  the  only  town  definitely  named  in  the  immediafe  neighborhood  of  Megiddo 
Taanach    upon   the   waters  of  Megiddo— is  undoubtedly   the  present  Tannuk,  four  miles  from 


14  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 

Thf  fniirffi  road,  round  the  southern  end  of  the  hills,  was  controlled  by 
Jezreel  and  to  a  certain  extent  by  Taanach.  The  size  of  the  tells  that 
mark  this  line  of  cities  testifies  to  the  importance  that  their  location  gave 
them  in  ancient  times.  This  whole  road  is  also  abundantly  supplied 
with  water. 

At  Tell  el-Mutesellim  the  Carmel  Ridge  suddenly  recedes  from  the 
plain,  forming  a  great  bay  or  indentation  in  the  hills  about  a  mile  deep 
and  a  mile  and  a  half  wide.  The  center  of  this  bay  is  occupied  by  a  group 
ofmounds^^on  the  highest  point  of  which  stands  the  Tell  (see  View  VI). 
Between  the  mounds,  marked  G,  H  ,1  on  Map  II,  and  the  foothills  enclos- 
ing the  bay  is  a  narrow  stretch  of  flat,  cultivated  land  which  thus  se- 
parates the  mounds,  of  which  the  Tell  forms  a  part,  from  the  main 
Ridge  (see  View  VII). 

To  the  north  and  east  of  the  Tell  extends  the  Plain  of  Esdra^lon, 
gradually  sloping  away  from  the  Ridge  to  the  Kishon  in  the  midst 
of  the  plain.  The  site  of  the  city  projects  slightly  beyond  the  line  of  the 
Carmel  Ridge,  Megiddo  enjoying  thereby  one  of  the  most  commanding 
positions  in  Palestine. ^o  The  whole  plain  lay  stretched  out  before  the 
inhabitants  of  the  city,  who  thus  obtained  a  sight  of  all  who  passed 
along  the  roads  across  the  plain. 

The  low  foothills.  A,  B,  C,  D  and  E,  which  enclose  the  bay,  rise  to  an 
average  height  of  about  two  or  three  hundred  feet  above  the  cultivated 
land  at  their  base.    With  the  exception  of  B,  which  is   lava,  they  are  of 

Lejjun  ;  and  there  even  seems  a  trace  or  the  name  in  the  name  the  Arabs  give  to  Kishon,  the 
Muqutta.  Omitting  this  last  item,  we  have  enough  of  evidence  to  support  Robinson's  identifica- 
tion ot  Lejjun  with  Megiddo,  even  against  the  plausible  rival  which  Major  Condor  has  favored 
in  MuiedJa',  a  site  with  considerable  ruins  at  the  foot  of  Gilboa,  above  Jordan  and  near  Beisan." 
To  this  evidence  may  be  added  that  from  the  Annals  of  Thutmose  III  in  which,  as  Breasted, 
Ancient  Records,  II,  426,  note  d,  points  out,  the  Asiatic  army,  which  fights  a  battle  before 
Megiddo,  has  its  south  wing  at  Taanach  5  hence  Megiddo  must  have  lain  not  far  to  the  north 
of  Taanach.  The  city  also  lay  near  the  opening  of  the  middle  one  of  three  roads  that  cross  the  Ridge, 
the  southernmost  of  which  came  out  near  Taanach.  I  have  already  shown  where,  according  to 
the  conformation  of  the  country,  this  road  must  have  lain,  and  just  at  the  mouth  of  the  middle 
road  is  Tell  el-Mutesellim.  For  a  refutation  of  Condor's  identification  see  G.  A.  Smith,  Hin. 
Geog.,   p.   887,  note. 

29.  I  have  here  used  the  term  "mound"  to  distinguish  these  three  elevations  from  the 
"hills"  behind  them  and  from  the  "knoll"  F.  They  are,  of  course,  not  artificial  mounds  but 
natural  elevations. 

30.  Hall,  y4nc.  Hist,  ef  the  h'ear  East,  p.  235,  erroneously  states  that  "both  towns" 
(  Meg'ddo  and  Taanach)  "stand  back  behind  the  ridge  halfwav  down  to  the  pain."  In  walk- 
ing across  Esdraeion  from  Megiddo  to  Nazareth,  1  have  been  impressed  with  the  remarkable  s^te 
that  Megiddo  occupied,  the  Tell  forming  one    of  the  most  conspiruous    features  of   the  Ian.  scape. 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  15 

limestone  formation,  to-day  totally  devoid  of  trees  and  covered  with  a 
scant  growth  of  thorns  and  bunch  grass.  The  limestone  is  laid  bare 
here  and  there  on  their  sides,  which  form  a  succession  of  rough  ledges 
where  the  scanty  soil  has  been  washed  away  by  the  heavy  winter  rains 
(see  View  IX).  If  these  hills  were  ever  under  cultivation,  all  traces  of 
it  have  entirely  disappeared.  Their  sides  are  of  moderate  steepness,  ris- 
ing at  an  angle  of  15"  to  20'.  At  the  point  marked  K  there  is  a  break 
in  the  encircling  hills,  the  cultivated  land  extending  into  the  gap  for 
some  distance  till  it  gradually  terminates  in  rocky  land  as  the  hills  a- 
gain  approach  the  plain.  Beyond  the  gap  K  the  enclosing  hills  terminate 
in  an  isolated  knoll,  marked  F  on  Map  II,  which  rises  only  about  seven- 
ty-five or  a  hundred  feet  above  the  surrounding  land.  This  knoll  is  also 
of  limestone  formation,  though  the  slopes  are  not  quite  so  rocky  as  are 
those  of  the  foothills  just  described  (see  View  V). 

Between  the  hills  A  and  B,  and  B  and  C  the  wadies  are  small  and  run 
back  for  only  a  short  distance  till  they  are  lost  in  the  hills  be'hind.  Be- 
tween C  and  D  is  a  wide  opening  known  as  Wady  es-Sitt,  receding  for 
some  two  miles  into  the  range  (see  View  X).  At  the  head  of  this 
wady  is  a  perennial  spring,  'Ain  es-Sitt,  of  considerable  size,  the  stream 
which  1  have  identified  with  the  Brook  Kina  of  the  Egyptian  sources 
(see  Map  II).  Between  hills  D  and  E  is  the  opening  of  the  pass  over  the 
Ridge  along  which  the  Egyptian  army  advanced  on  Megiddo.  The  culti- 
vated land  lying  between  these  foothills  and  the  group  of  mounds  G,  H, 
and  I,  on  which  Megiddo  stood,  is  flat  and  free  from  large  stones.  At 
the  northern  end  opposite  Megiddo  this  strip  is  about  a  fifth  of  a  mile 
wide,  gradually  broadening  as  it  sweeps  around  to  the  south  and  east 
till  opposite  the  mouth  of  the  pass  it  attains  a  width  of  about  half  a 
mile  (see  View  VII).  Across  this  strip  of  land  the  Kina  has  cut  a  chan- 
nel, ranging  from  two  to  three  feet  deep  at  the  opening  of  the  Wady  es- 
Sitt,  marked  "a"  on  Map  II,  to  fifteen  or  eighteen  feet  deep  at  the  point 
"b"  and  beyond  (See  ViewXI).  After  crossing  the  cultivated  land  the 
brook  turns  at  right  angles  and  runs  along  the  edge  of  the  mounds  H  and 
I,  turning  again  so  as  to  flow  between  the  mound  I  and  the  knoll  F,  till  it 
enters  the  plain  of  Esdraelon.  The  channel  of  the  stream  is  uniformly  fif- 
teen to  twenty  feet  below  the  bank  on  either  hand.  These  banks  are  fair- 
ly steep  and  continue  so  till  they  fall  away  gradually,  so  that  at  "c"  it  is 


16  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 

possible  for  the  road  to  Taanach  to  cross  the  stream  with  only  a  slight 
descent  of  three  or  four  feet.  At  "b"  a  road  crosses  the  stream  by  a  steep 
descent,  while  at  "d"  there  is  a  bridge. 

The  two  mounds  G  and  H,  together  with  the  Tell,  are  really  one, 
though  they  are  separated  by  slight  depressions.  The  Tell  is  the  high- 
est part  of  the  group,  being  125  feet  above  'Ain  el-Kubbi  at  its  northern 
base.  The  mound  G  is  slightly  lower,  averaging  about  one  hundred  feet 
above  the  'Ain.  Between  the  two  is  a  narrow  cut  or  trench,  possibly 
partly  artificial,  having  been  dug  out  as  a  sort  of  dry  moat  to  render  the 
the  city  less  accessible  on  that  side,  but  partly  caused  by  the  gradual 
rising  of  the  Tell  from  age  to  age,  as  city  after  city  was  bviilt  and  de- 
stroyed on  its  site.  This  depression  is  some  thirty  feet  deep.  The  sur- 
face of  mound  G  is  level,  except  for  the  ruins  of  Graeco-Roman  struc- 
tures with  which  it  is  to-day  encumbered.  Between  G  and  H  there  is 
only  a  slight  depression  of  a  few  feet.  The  surface  of  H  is  also  covered 
with  remains  of  late  buildings  and  is,  moreover,  by  nature  not  so  level 
as  is  G.  Between  the  two  mounds  G  and  H  and  the  mound  I  there  is  a 
considerable  depression  through  which  at  present  a  road  runs.  I  is  much 
lower  than  H,  rising  not  more  than  forty  to  fifty  feet  above  '  Ainel- 
Kubbi.  Its  surface  is  level. 

The  sides  of  the  Tell  slope  sharply  to  the  plain  on  either  hand,  run- 
ning down  at  about  an  angle  of  30°  in  many  places  (see  View  XII).  The 
sides  of  the  mounds  G,  H,  and  I  are  much  more  gradual  for  the  most 
part,  except  on  the  side  where  H  borders  on  the  brook  Kina,  at  which 
place  the  land  descends  more  abruptly  to  the  bed  of  the  stream.  On  the 
west  of  these  mounds  the  ascent  is  gradual  (see  View  XIII),  so  much  so 
that  a  wheeled  vehicle  could  with  ease  drive  on  to  the  mounds  from  that 
side.  The  north  side  of  the  Tell  descends  to  a  sort  of  terrace  raised  some 
feet  above  the  plain  beyond.  Just  below  this  terrace  is  the  spring,  'Ain 
el-Kubbi,  which  in  ancient  times  supplied  the  inhabitants  of  Megiddo 
with  water. 

Along  the  east  side  of  the  Tell  runs  the  road  spoken  of  on  page  13  as 
cf)nnecting  the  line  of  cities  which  guarded  the  series  of  crossroads  on 
the  northern  side  of  the  Carmel  Ridge.  From,  or  across,  this  road  at 
the  points  marked  e,  f,  g,  h,  and  i,  run  other  roads  all  of  which  con- 
verge on  the  mouth  of  the  pass  leading  over  the  Ridge  south  of  the 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  17 

city.  No  better  evidence  of  the  importance  of  this  same  pass  could  be  of- 
fered than  the  presence  of  these  five  roads  all  leading  into  this  one  valley. 

At  about  the  time  of  Thutmose  Ill's  campaign  Megiddo  was  a  strong- 
ly fortified  place.  Its  defences  consisted  of  a  massive  brick  wall  enclos- 
ing an  area  roughly  oval  in  shape,  some  three  hundred  and  fifteen  me- 
ters long  by  two  hundred  and  thirty  meters  wide.  31  The  wall,  supported 
by  buttresses  at  intervals,  was  about  ten  meters  high  and  six  meters 
thick,  protected  especially  on  the  south  and  west  against  the  driving  of 
the  winter  rains  by  a  projecting  glacis.  There  is  no  evidence  of  a  moat 
around  the  city,  though  on  the  south  the  Tell  is  separated  from  the 
mound  G  by  the  depression  already  spoken  of.  The  excavations  have  dis- 
closed only  two  gates,  one  on  the  south  and  one  on  the  north, -^2  though  there 
were  probably  others  as  yet  undiscovered.  The  city's  natural  defences  were 
weakest  on  the  south  and  west,  where  the  height  of  the  Tell  above 
the  plain  is  much  less  than  on  the  east  and  north.  This  may  in  part  ac- 
count for  the  fact  that  the  projecting  glacis  along  the  foot  of  the  wall  is 
broadest  on  those  sides,  thus  rendering  it  more  difficult  to  scale  the 
wall  with  ladders. 33 

Megiddo  makes  its  advent  into  history  with  the  first  campaign  of 
Thutmose  III.  That  its  story  runs  far  back  of  any  written  record  is 
certain,  not  only  from  the  evidence  of  neolithic  settlement  on  the  site 
which  the  excavation  of  the  Tell  has  disclosed,  34  bvit  also  because  we 
cannot  suppose  that  a  situation  so  favorable  to  human  habitation  would 
not  have  been  early  occupied.  Its  abundant  water  supply, 35  its  isolated 
position  rendering  it  easily  defensible  on  all  sides,  its  close  relation  to 
the  rich  plain  of  Esdraelon,  and  finally,  when  commerce  had  developed, 
its  command  of  the  natural  highway  from  Mesopotamia  to  Egypt, 
would  all  offer  unusual  inducements  to  the  growth  of  a  large  and  flourish- 
ing settlement.  However,  its  situation  on  the  great  artery  of  commerce 
was  the  most  determining  factor.38    In  the  early  world,  after  trade  be- 

31.    Schumacher,   Tell  el-Muteiellim,  1,  p.    23  fF. 
31.    Schumachrr,  op.   cie.,    I,     p.    77  ft",   and  p.   47 

33.  Ci.    Holscher,   Holies   Tor  fori  Mcdiriet  Hahu,    p    63. 

34.  Schumacher,  op    cit.,   I,  p.    11   ft. 

35.  The  K.ina,  which  flows  by  the  Tell,  is  the  most  considerable  aftluent  of  the  Kishon  on 
the  south. 

36.  This    was  the    road    across  the  Ridge  mentioned  in    the  Tabula  Peutingeriana    and  was 
in    Arab  times,  except  during  the  supremacy  of  the     Crusaders,  the  regular   way  tor  the    caravans 


18  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 

tween  Egypt  and  the  north  had  taken  extensively  to  the  land  route, 
such  cities  undoubtedly  collected  heavy  toll  from  the  passing  caravans 
of  merchants,  much  as  did  the  feudal  barons  of  the  Middle  Ages. 

Not  only  did  Megiddo  command  the  great  route  from  Mesopotamia, 
but  it  also  lay  on  the  road  connecting  the  Phoenician  Plain  with  the  hills 
of  Ephraim  and  Judah.  The  commerce  which  sought  these  highlands 
came  down  from  the  coast  cities  and,  turning  inland  after  it  left  Acre, 
passed  through  the  narrow  gap  at  the  northern  end  of  Esdraelon,  along 
the  base  of  the  Carmel  Ridge,  by  Megiddo  and  Taanach,  and  on  to  Sa- 
maria and  Jerusalem. 37  While  these  trade  routes  flourished,  Megiddo 
or  its  successor  Legio  (modern  Lejjun),  were  prominent  cities,  but  when 
commerce  lapsed  or  was  diverted  elsewhere,  they  sank  into  insignifi- 
cance. 

But  the  military  significance  of  Megiddo  was  not  less  marked  than 
was  its  commercial  importance.  The  Carmel  Ridge,  cutting  through 
the  coast  plain  to  the  very  shore  of  the  sea,  stands  like  a  rampart 
erected  against  an  attack  on  Syria  from  the  south.  All  south  of  Carmel 
is  the  level,  uninterrupted  coast  plain,  stretching  into  the  Sinaitic  desert 
south  of  Gaza.  From  this  latter  point  to  the  boundaries  of  Egypt  is  des- 
ert save  for  the  few  wells  or  springs  at  intervals  along  the  road.  The 
Egyptian  invader  of  Syria  has  met  opposition  between  the  Delta  and 
Carmel  only  at  one  point,  the  neighborhood  of  Gaza,^^  where  the  des- 
ert meets  the  fertile  land  of  the  Philistine  Plain.  Did  the  Egyptian  en- 
counter defeat  at  this  point,  he  found  himself  in  a  dangerous  situation 
indeed,  with  only  the  desert  road  behind  him  and  no  refuge  from  a  pur- 
suing foe  till  the  frontier  forts  at  Tharu  were  reached.  Thus  any  cam- 
paign that  aimed  at  gaining  the  Plain  of  Esdraelon  fell  naturally  into 
three  movements:  first,  the  advance  to  Gaza;  second,  the  advance  along 
the  Philistine  Plain;  and  third,  the  crossing  of  the  Carmel  Ridge. 

In  the  Annals  these  natural  stages  in  the  campaign  have  been  noted, 
showing  that  already  the  military  commanders  of  the  day  conducted  no 
haphazzard    warfare,    but    took    into   account    the  larger   problems  of 

from  Damascus  to  Cairo.  See  Hartmann,  "Die  Strasse  voii  Damaskus  nach  Kairo,"  ZDMG, 
64,  p.  665  ff. 

37.  This  was  the  route    frequently     followed  by  the     Assyrian  armies,     and  liter  by  the  pil- 
grims of  the  Middle  Ages. 

38.  G.  A.   Smith,  Hist.   Geog.,  p.    184.    Olmstead,  Stirgon  of  Assy  ia,  p.  54. 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  19 

military  tactics,  and  were  fully  aware  of  the  importance  in  the  successful 
manipulation  of  troops  attached  to  an  accurate  knowledge  of  the  topog- 
raphy of  the  field  of  operations.^^  The  Egyptian  wars  of  liberation  had 
developed  the  first  known  school  of  military  experts  at  all  commen- 
surable with  modern  army  boards. 

Why  the  Allies  did  not  meet  Thutmose's  advance  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Gaza  is  not  entirely  clear.  For  one  thing,  such  a  move  would  have 
taken  them  far  from  their  northern  base  of  operations.  Moreover,  the 
south  seems  to  have  been  either  friendly,  or,  at  most,  not  actively  hos- 
til,  to  the  Egyptians.  The  fact  that  the  list  of  the  cities  said  to  have  been 
"captured"  on  the  first  campaign^o  includes  the  names  of  many  towns 
in  southern  Palestine,  would  not  weigh  heavily  against  this  view,  when 
we  take  into  consideration  the  evident  fact  that,  in  all  the  lists  of  con- 
quered cities,  any  places  of  importance  included  within  the  field  of  ope- 
rations were  regularly  enumerated,  whether  they  had  been  loyal  to  the 
Pharaoh  or  had  rebelled. 

Suffice  it  to  say  that,  having  failed  to  seize  the  first  natural  point  of 
resistance  to  the  Egyptians,  the  King  of  Kadesh  took  up  his  position 
at  the  next  natural  rampart,  the  Carmel  Ridge.  There  he  could  secure 
the  most  advantageous  position  for  repulsing  the  invaders.  That,  having 
shown  his  appreciation  of  the  strength  of  this  position  by  deliberately 
taking  his  stand  at  Megiddo,  he  should  then  have  thrown  away  the  ad- 
vantage afforded  by  the  narrowness  of  the  mountain  pass  through  which 
Thutmose  was  compelled  to  move,  is  as  remarkable  as  it  is  inexplica- 
ble.*'  At  any  rate  the  Allies  permitted  Thutmose  to  accomplish  the  first 
two  movements  of  the  campaign,  the  march  to  Gaza  and  thence  to  the 


■59.  The  Anridlsgive  in  connection  with  this  campaign  the  dates  of  the  foUowin  gevents: 
(i)  the  departure  from  Tharu,  (2)  the  arrival  at  Gaza,  (3)  the  departure  from  Gaza,  (4) 
the  arrival  at  Yehem,  (5)  the  departure  from  'Aruna,  (6)  the  Battle  of  Megiddo.  The  first 
two  dates  mark  the  first  stage  of  the  campaign;  the  s-cond  two,  the  second  stage;  and  the  last 
two,  tlie  third  stage. 

40.  U'k,  IV,  pp.   jjg--ji6. 

41.  The  military  importance  of  this  road  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  the  Romans  placed  a 
strong  force  at  the  northern  end,  at  Legio,  modern  Lejjun,  the  actual  camp  itself  probably  oc- 
cupying the  knoll  marked  F  on  Map  II.  Cf.  Schumacher,  Te//  el-Mutesellim,  I,  p  88.  G.A. 
Smith,  Hist.  Geog.,  p.  389,  calls  attention  to  the  frequent  occurance  of  the  names  Bethshan, 
Taanach,  Megiddo,  Dor,  as  marking  a  line  of  fortresses  "on  the  one  great  avenue  across  coun- 
try", and  refers  to  Josh,  xxvi,  ll:  Judges  i,  27:  I  Kings  iv.  12:  I  Chron.  vii,  29.  These 
cities  were  all  strong  fortresses  and  held  out  against  the  Hebrew  attempts  at  conquest,  remaining 
Canaanite  till  late  in  their  history. 


20  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 

Carmel  Ridge,  without  opposition,  nor  do  they  seem  in  any  way  to  have 
taken  advantage  of  the  difficulties  the  Egyptians  encountered  in  accom- 
plishing the  third  movement  to  strike  Thutmose  under  circumstances  so 
favorable  to  the  success  of  the  Allies.  Our  meager  sources  must 
leave  us  forever  ignorant  of  the  reasons  of  the  Allies  for  thus  throwing 
away  their  greatest  chance  of  victory. 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  21 


II 


THE    PROBLEM   OF  THE   CARMEL   RTDGE 
THE   ANNALS,   LINES   18-49 

Urk.649  [  His  Majesty  J  commanded  (19)  to  counsil  together  with  liis 
victorious  army,  saying,  "Now  that  [wretched]  enemy  (20)  of 
Kedesh,  having  come  and  having  entered  into  Megiddo,  he  is 
[there]  (21)  at  this  moment.  He  has  assembled  to  himself  the 
chiefs  of    [  all  ]   the    countries  [which    were]     (22)   subject    to 

Egypt  as  far    as  Naharin,    consisting  of  (23)    the 

Kharu,  the  Kode,  their  troops, [their  peopIe;](24)  for  he  says,  it  is 
reported,  'I  am  ready  to  [fight  against  his  Majesty  here]  (25)  in 
Megiddo'.  Tell  ye  me  [that  which  is  in  your  hearts."] 

(26)  They  said  in  the  presence  of  his  Majesty,  "How  is  it 
possible  to  march  **2  upon(27)this  road  which  becomes  narrower? 
It  is  [reported]  (28)  saying,   'The  enemy  are  there,  ready    upon 

Urk.  650  [the  outside,43  and  they  are]  (29)  becoming  numerous.'  Will  not 
horse  go  behind  [horse,  the  troops]  (30)  and  the  people  like- 
wise? Shall  our  vanguard  be  (31)  fighting,  while  the  [rear- 
guard] is  yet  standing  (32)  in  'Aruna,  without  their  having 
fought?  Now  there  are  still  two  roads.  (33)  One  road,  behold 
it  is  our  '*''  it  comes  out  at  (34)  Taanach. 


42.  Lit.     "It  is  like  what  to  go  upon  this  road?" 

43.  So  Sethe's  restoration,  probably  taken  from  Urk.  IV,  655,  5,  where  it  undoubtedly 
refers  to  the  king  waiting  at  the  mouth  of  the  pass.  This  restoration  would  then  suppose  that 
the  mejSengers  report  the  enemy  to  be  assembled  at  the  pass  "outside"  the  valley  or  the  moun- 
tains. Breasted,  Ancient  Records,  II,  421,  restores  "holding  the  way  against  a  multitude"  which 
would  seem  to  fill  the  lacuna  as  well  as  Sethe's  as  far  as  the  hieroglyphics  are  concerned,  though 
the  report  of  the  massengers  would  not  then  agree  with  the  situation  as  disclosed  on  the  king's 
arrival  at  the  mouth  ot  the  pass. 

44.  Sethe  restores,  "Behold  it  is  excellent  for  our  lord".  Hall,  Anc.  Hist,  of  the  Near 
East,  p.   236,    gives  "there  is  that    one  which  is  best  for  us".  Breasted,  Ancient  Records,  II, 


22  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 

The  other,  behold  it  is  at  the  (35)  north  side^s   of  Zefti,  so  that 
we  shall  come  out  at  the  north  of  Megiddo.     (36)  Let  our  vic- 
torious lord  proceed  according  to  the  de[sign  of]  his  heart  there- 
in, (37)  but  do  not   cause   us  to   march   upon  this  impassable 
road."    Then  [were  brought]  (38)  massages  concerning   [that 
wretched]  foe.       [Then   was  reported   the  information  ?]  con- 
cerning [this]  matter  (39)   which  they   had  mentioned  before. 
Urk.  651     Spoken  in  the  Majesty  of  the  Court,  L.P.H.  "I  [swear]  (40) 
as  Re   loves  me,  as  my  father  Amon  favors  me,  as  my  nostrils 
are  renewed  (41)  with  satisfying   life,   my   Majesty   proceeds 
upon  this  'Aruna  road.     (42)  Let  him  whose  desire  it  is  among 
you   march    along   these  (43)  roads  you  have  mentioned.      Let 
him  whose  desire  it  is  among  you  go    (44)    in  the   following  of 
my  Majesty.  Do  not  let  them  think  among  these   (45)   enemies 
whom  Re  detests,  'Does  his  Majesty  proceed  upon  (46)  another 
road    (because)   he   is  beginning   to  fear    us?'    (So)  they  will 
think."     (47)  They  said  in  the  presence  of  his  Majesty;     "May 
thy  father    Amon,   Lord  of  Thebes,  Presider   over  Karnak,  do 
[according  to  thy  desire.]  (48)  Behold  us  as  the  following  of  thy 
Majesty  in  whatever  place  [thy  Majesty]  proceeds.     (49)  The 
servant  is  at  the  back  of  [his]  lord." 
Having   arrived    at    Yehem,   somewhere   on  the  south  of  the  Carmel 
Ridge,  Thutmose   halted    long   enough   to  hold  a   council  of  war,  as  the 
Annals  puts  it,  with  "his  troops".      The  messengers  which  appear  later 
in  the  account,  were  undoubtedly  spies  who  had  been  sent  ahead  by  the 
Pharaoh  to  ascertain  the  whereabouts  of  the  enemy.     In  all  probability 
it  was  their  return  with  the  news  of  the  preparation  made  by  the  Allies 
on  the  north  of  the  Ridge  to  check  the  Egyptian  advance  that  led  the 
Pharaoh  to  call    the   council.  There  will  certainly  have  been  frequent 
conferences   between    the    Pharoah    and  his  officers.  The  j^riestly  scribe 

421,  gives,    "one    road,     behold,  it     will us".      Mnspcro,     Recieil,  II,    p.<;i,  gives,   "un 

chemin  voici  qu'il  nous  mettra  sur  la  grande  route  a  I'Ouest  de  Taanaka".  The  remarkable  thing 
about  this  passage  is  that  on  it  several  historians  have  based  a  srateme  't  that  the  officers  advocated 
one  of  the  roads  in  preference  to  the  other,  when,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  we  do  not  know  what 
they  said  of  the  Taanach  road,  owing  to  the  lacuna,  while  th -y  certainly  did  not  sav  that  the 
Zetti  rond  was  preferable. 

45.    Or,     "at  the  road  north  of  Zefti".       This,     however,  is     improbable,  as  the  Annalist 
never  elsewhere  uses  w'-r  of  "road"  but  prefers  tnni  instead. 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  23 

who  made  these  excerpts  from  the  daily  records  of  the  campaign  gives 
us  such  full  details  of  this  particular  council  because  of  the  importance 
of  its  decisions  on  subsequent  events,  but  chiefly  because  it  brings  out 
prominently  the  fearlessness  of  the  king  in  contrast  to  the  cautious 
nature  of  his  officers.  Like  many  oriental  military  records  the  doings  of 
subordinates  are  introduced  only  as  a  foil  to  the  overshadowing  figure 
of  the  monarch. 

The  king  opens  the  conference  by  laying  before  his  officers  the  infor- 
mation received:  first,  that  the  King  of  Kadesh  has  already  occupied 
Megiddo;  second,  that  he  is  at  the  head  of  a  strong  coalition  reaching  as 
far  as  Naharin  in  the  north;  and,  third,  that  he  is  preparing  to  make  a 
stand  at  Megiddo  against  the  Egyptian  army.  In  view  of  this  situation 
the  king  asks  the  advice  of  his  officers  as  to  how  to  proceed.  Such  is  the 
brief  account  given  in  the  Annals  of  the  drift  of  the  royal  speech.  How- 
ever, as  the  officers  at  once  begin  to  object  to  the  advance  by  the  direct 
road,  we  must  suppose  that  the  king  had  already  pointed  out  this  road 
as  the  one  he  intended  to  take. 

Upon  hearing  the  royal  decision  the  officers  seem  to  have  been  dismay- 
ed, though  we  may  be  sure  that  their  consternation  has  suffered  no 
diminution  at  the  pen  of  the  royal  secretary,  who  would  seek  thereby 
to  enhance  h"s  master's  own  reputation  for  daring.  The  interrogative 
form  of  their  reply  (lit.  "It  is  like  what  to  go  upon  this  road  which  be- 
comes narrower?"),  trembles  with  their  surprise  and  fear.  They  at  once 
raise  the  objection  that  the  spies  have  brought  information  to  the  effect 
that  the  enemy  are  waiting  just  outside  the  pass  the  king  has  chosen 
and  that  they  are,  in  all  probability,  very  numerous,  or,  if  we  accept 
Breasted's  restoration,"*^  they  are  making  great  preparations  to  dispute 
this  very  road  with  the  Egyptians.  Besides,  the  officers  declare,  the  road 
is  too  narrow  to  allow  of  any  military  formation  being  maintained.'*'' 
The  army  will  be  strung  out  in  such  a  long,  thin  line  that  the  advance 
guard  will  already  have  come  in  contact  with    the   enemy    before    the 

46.  Ancient  Records,  II,  421. 

47.  An  interesting  commentary  on  this  statement  is  the  passage  from  Judith,  iv,  6-7;  "Also 
Joacim  the  high  priest,  which  was  in  those  days  in  Jerusalem,  wrote  to  them  that  dwelt  in  Be- 
thulia  and  Betomestham,  which  is  over  against  Esdraslon,  towards  the  open  country,  near  to  Do- 
thaim,  charging  them  to  keep  the  passages  of  the  hill  country:  for  bv  them  there  was  an  entrance 
into  Jud-a,  and  it  was  easy  to  stop  them  that  would  come  up,  because  the  passage  was  strait,  for 
two    men  at  most",  or,  as  a  variant  lias  it,   "as  they  came    up,  the  pass    being  narrow,  in  double 


24  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 

rear  guard  has  left  'Aruna.  As  alternative  routes  they  suggest  two 
other  roads, "^8  one  of  which  issues  from  the  mountains  in  the  direction 
of  Taanach,  and  the  other  of  which,  passing  on  the  north  of  Zefti,  issues 
to  the  north  of  Megiddo. "^^  The  royal  wrath  at  this  objection  to  the 
'Aruna  road  was  probably  apparent  by  this  time,  for  the  officers  close 
their  advice  by  acknowledging  the  supremacy  of  the  Pharaoh's  will,  but 
still  they  beg  that  he  will  not  choose  the  difficult  mountain  pass.  In  sup- 
port of  their  request  they  further  submit  the  report  of  the  spies  to  which 
they  had  already  referred. 

The  situation  in  which  the  Egyptian  army  now  found  itself  is  evident 
from  the  foregoing  account  of  the  progress  of  the  council.  It  is  apparent 
that  the  halt  was  made  at  Yehem,  because,  in  view  of  the  report  of  the 
spies,  it  was  necessary  for  those  in  charge  of  the  campaign  to  decide  how 
the  Ridge,  lying  between  them  and  the  enemy,  was  to  be  crossed,  ^ehem 
lay  at,  or  near,  the  junction  of  three   well-known  roads,  and  it  now  be- 

file  at  most."  The  actual  character  of  this  pass  is  an  interesting  illustration  of  the  meaning  ot  the 
Egyptian  phrase  iv^  r,  the  various  suggestions  in  regard  to  the  meaning  ot  which  I  have  men- 
tioned in  note  5.  As  the  traveller  advances  along  the  road,  he  is  impressed  by  the  fact  that  the 
wady  becomes  steadily  narrower  (seepages  10-12)  thus  conforming  to  the  idea  of  a  gradual 
change  of  condition  for  the  worse,  which  seems  to  underlie  the    Egyptian  idiom. 

48.  Maspero,  Struggle  of  the  Nations,  p.  256,  states  that  the  officers  of  the  king  advised 
Thutmose  to  follow  the  road  that  ran  to  the  north  ot  Zefti.  There  is  no  evidence  for  this  state- 
ment in  the  Annals,  as  they  specifically  st.ite  that  two  roads  were  suggested,  either  of  which  were 
acceptable  to  the  generals.  Budge,  Hiit.  of  Egypt,  IV,  p  32,  makes  the  statement  that  "of 
three  roads  that  lead  to  Megiddo,  two  were  rejected  by  the  generals  as  unsuitable,  but  the  king 
decided  to  march  there  by  one  of  them.'"  There  is  a  break  in  the  inscription  at  this  point  where 
Sethe  restores  "One  road,  behold  it  '\s  excellent  for  our  lord;  it  comes  out  at  Taanach."  The 
surviving  portions  of  the  Annals,  however,  contain  nothing  to  indicate  that  any  preference  was 
expressed  by  the  officers. 

49.  Maspero,  Struggle  of  the  Nations,  p.  257,  note  I,  (as  mentioned  on  p.  7,  note  14) 
locates  Yehem  at  el-Kheimeh  and  indentifies  Zefti  with  Saffa,  about  halt  way  between  Jerusalem 
and  Jaffa.  He  says,  "The  third  road  ran  north  of  Zatiti,  to  meet  the  great  highway  that  cuts 
the  hill  district  of  Nablus,  skirting  the  foot  of  Tabor  near  Jenin,  a  little  to  the  north  of  Megid- 
do." There  are  certain  objections  to  this  identification.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  difficult  to  see 
why  it  should  have  taken  the  Egyptians  from  the  fifth  to  the  sixteenth  of  the  month  to  cover 
tlie  short  distance  from  Gaza  to  Satfa,  something  less  than  fifty  miles,  while  for  the  next  fifty 
miles,  from  SafFa  to  the  Carmel  Ridge,  they  required  only  from  the  sixteenth  to  the  nineteenth. 
The  second  fifty  miles  will  also  have  been  through  the  more  hostile  portion  of  the  country  where 
one  would  expect  the  progress  to  have  been  slower.  In  the  second  place,  the  road  by  Taanach, 
which  was  suggested  as  an  alternate  route  to  the  one  north  of  Zefti,  would  enter  the  Plain 
of  Esdrjelon  at  almost  exactly  the  same  spot  as  the  road  from  Nablus  to  Jenin  and  the  latter  roaii 
would  therefore  otter  no  advantages  over  the  Taanach  road  for  an  armv  operating  agrinst 
Megiddo.  Moreover,  one  fails  to  see  why  'he  officers  should  have  desired  to  take  a  road  which 
skirted  "the  foot  of  Tabor  near  Jenin",  coming  out  on  the  nortii  of  .VIegiddo,  when  they 
would  thereby  expose  their  line  of  communication  with  the  south  to  the  attack  of  the  enemy, 
and  would  also  have  to  march  across  the  whole  width  of  Esdra'lon  only  to  inaich  back  again  to 
Megiddo. 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  25 

came  necessary,  before  advancing  further,  to  decide  upon  one  of  these 
roads  as  the  route  to  be  pursued.'*^  The  king  favored  the  one  known  as 
the  'Aruna  road,  which  we  learn  from  the  later  developments  of 
the  campaign,  issued  from  the  mountains  at  Megiddo.  It  is  described  as 
being  very  narrow  and  difficult,  but  in  this  matter  due  allowance  must 
be  made  for  exaggeration  on  the  part  of  the  officers  who  desired  to  avoid 
it  and  who  would  naturally  paint  its  disadvantages  in  the  most  lurid 
hues.  That  this  road  crossed  the  Ridge  between  the  two  roads  which  the 
officers  favored  is  also  evident,  for  one  of  these  latter  roads  entered  the 
plain  towards  Taanach,  which  is  to  the  south  of  Megiddo,  and  the  other 
road  is  specifically  stated  to  have  issued  from  the  mountains  north  of 
Megiddo. 

That  the  Pharaoh's  officers  were  familiar  with  the  country  before 
them  is  evident.  Possibly  the  spies  who  had  been  sent  forward  to  re- 
connoitre had  brought  back  information  in  regard  to  these  mountain 
passes,  though  the  campaigns  and  commerce  of  the  preceding  century 
must  also  have  made  the  Egyptians  fully  acquainted  with  the  roads  of 
Palestine-Syria,  especially  with  the  great  route  to  and  from  the  Eu- 
phrates. This  same  road  across  the  Carmel  Ridge  apparently  did  not 
enjoy  a  very  savory  reputation  among  the  Egyptians.  It  is  probably 
that  described  in  Papyrus  Anastasi  1,  where  its  dangers  and  difficulties 
are  dwelt  on  with  a  wealth  of  harrowing  detail,  including  wild  men  of 
more  than  human  ferocity,  and  deep  gorges  such  as  are  scarcely  found  in 
Palestine  at  all  and  certainly  not  in  the  region  of  Megiddo. ^o  This  des- 
cription of  the  famous  road  cannot  be  taken  seriously.  It  is  in  the  gen- 
eral tone  of  the  rest  of  this  remarkable  papyrus,  exaggerated  and  dis- 
torted beyond  all  measure  wherever  the  writer  is  describing  the  utter 
incompetency  and  cowardice  of  the  "Maher",  and  designed  through- 
out to  exhibit  the  writer's  erudition  and  knowledge  of  strange  words 
and  names.  Although,  of  course,  the  papyrus  dates  from  several   hund- 

49.  For  a    discussion    of    the  historical  importance   of  these  passes  see  G.  A.  Smith,    Hist. 
Geog.,  p.  I  50  fF. 

50.  Gardiner,   Hieratic  Texts,  I,  pp.   25-27:  "Beliold  tlie    is  in  a  ravine  two  thousand 

cubits  deep,  filled  with  boulders  and  pebbles.  *******  The  (.')  narrow  defile  is 
infested  (.')  with  Shosu  concealed  beneath  the  bushes;  some  of  them  are  of  four  cubits,  or  of 
five  cubits,  from  head  (.')  to  foot  {>),  fierce  of  face,  their  heart  is  not  mild,  and  they  hearken 
not  to  coaxing.  ***********  Thy  path  is  filled  with  boulders  and  pebbles, 
without  a  passable  track  {})  overgrown  with  reeds  and  brambles,  briers  and  wolf-pads.  The 
ravine  is  on  one  side  of  thee,  the  mountain  rises   on  the  other." 


26  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 

red  years  after  the  Megiddo  campaign, s'  it  still  serves  to  show  that  the 
road  was  regarded  as  rough  and  dangerous,  even  w^hen  Syria  was  far 
better  know  to  the  Egyptians  than  in  Thutmose's  day. 

Roads,  especially  where  they  are  not  paved,  shift  from  age  to  age.  In 
the  Orient  this  is  especially  true  of  the  roads  that  traverse  the  plains. 
New  paths  are  constantly  being  made,  their  direction  being  governed 
largely  by  the  rise  or  fall  of  towns  and  by  shifts  in  the  trend  of  com- 
merce.^^  One  has  only  to  note  the  Roman  roads,  remains  of  which  still 
survive  throughout  Syria  and  Palestine  but  so  many  of  which  no  longer 
mark  lines  of  travel,  to  note  how  impossible  it  is  to  dogmatize  on  the 
location  of  an  ancient  road  from  data  furnished  by  modern  roads.  In 
mountainous  regions,  however,  we  have  data  on  which  to  base  a  con- 
clusion in  regard  to  the  location  of  an  ancient  road  that  do  not  exist  in 
the  case  of  more  level  country.  We  can  rest  assured  that  in  ancient,  as 
in  classical,  mediaeval  and  modei'n  times,  roads  which  crossed  moimtain 
ranges  followed  the  courses  marked  out  by  nature,  the  passes  which  still 
exist  to-day.  When,  therefore,  w^e  look  for  the  roads  which  Thutmose's 
council  discussed  and  which  crossed  the  Carmel  Ridge,  we  can  turn  to 
the  map  of  the  country  as  it  is  to-day  and  feel  assured  that  from  it 
we  can  learn  with  reasonable  certainty  the  possible  routes  by  which  the 
Ridge  would  have  been  crossed  in  antiquity.  That  there  was  no  road, 
other  than  a  rough  donkey-path,  over  the  southern  end  of  Umm  el- 
Fahm  is  obvious  from  any  careful  study  of  the  map.  Or  that  any  army 
wishing  to  go  from  the  coast  plain  by  the  most  direct  road  to  Megiddo 
should  choose  any  other  route  than  that  by  the  Wady  'Arah  is  difficult 
to  conceive.  Any  other  course  would  have  necessitated  the  scaling  of  a 
succession  of  rough  hills,  a  most  fatiguing  and  unnecessary  labor,  when 
right  at  hand  lay  a  direct  and  easy  course  along  the  bottom  of  the  wady 
which  led  directly  to  the  desired  goal.  In  the  preceding  description  of 
the  Carmel  Ridge,  I  have  pointed  out  the  fact  that  all  the  passes  of  the 
mountain  are  occupied  to-day  by  roads.  Therefore,  in  discussing  the 
situation  that  now  confronted  Thutmose,  I  shall  take  it  for  granted  that 
the  roads  considered  by  the  council  of  war  were  essentially  the  same,  as 
far  as  location  goes,  with  those  that  cross  the  Ridge  to-day  and  the  his- 

51.  Gardiner,  op.  cit.,  p.  I . 

52.  Cf.  Ramsey,  Hist.   Geo^.  of  Asia  Minor,  p.  83. 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  27 

tory  of  which  we  can  trace  back  to  Roman  times  in  the  remains  of  the 
paving  still  in  situ. 

A  glance  at  Map  I  will  show  the  road  the  king  advocated.  The 
road  can  be  none  other  than  the  one  running  from  Tell  el-Asawir  by 
'Ain  'Arab  past  'Ain  Ibrahim  to  Megiddo.  The  king  evidently  preferred 
to  make  directly  for  the  enemy's  position.  The  officers,  on  the  other  hand, 
feared  the  narrow  mountain  defile,  where  the  army  would  be  strung  out 
in  a  long  line  and  so  would  be  particularly  liable  to  attack.  The  enemy, 
sweeping  down  from  the  heights  on  either  hand,  would  be  able  to  cut 
such  a  line  in  two  and  do  great  damage  before  any  united  resistance 
could  be  offered.  The  gentle  slopes  leading  into  the  wady  would  offer 
opportunities  for  a  considerable  body  of  men  to  make  such  a  descent 
with  ease  on  any  army  crossing  the  pass  (see  View  III).  If,  on  the  con- 
trary, Megiddo  could  be  approached  from  the  side  of  the  plain,  not  only 
would  the  dangers  of  the  pass  the  avoided,  but  ample  opportunity 
would  be  given  for  the  use  of  the  chariotry,53  which  branch  of  the  service 
would  be  only  a  hinderancc  in  the  mountain  defile.  The  officers,  there- 
fore, advocated  either  one  of  two  other  roads.  One  of  these  came 
out  of  the  mountains  towards  Taanach.  This  can  have  been  none  other 
than  the  one  running  around  the  southern  end  of  the  Ridge  through  the 
Plain  of  '  Arrabeh,  entering  Esdraelon  in  the  neighborhood  of  Jenin.^* 
By  pursuing  this  course,  the  plain  could  be  reached  considerably  to  the 
south  of  Megiddo  and  the  advance  on  the  city  could  then  be  made  by 
way  of  Taanach.  Here  too  the  open  plain  would  offer  ample  opportunity 
for  manoeuvres  and  would  enable  the  Egyptians  to  bring  all  their  force 
into  action  at  once,  thus  avoiding  the  danger  of  their  being  defeated  in 
detail,  as  might  be  the  case  if  they  took  the  'Aruna  road. 

The  other  road  favored  by  the  council  is  less  certain  of  identification. 
It  is  possible  that  it  may  have  been  the  road  branching  off  from  the 
Wady  'Arab  at  'Ain  'Arab  and  issuing  from  the  mountains  near  Tell  el- 
Aghbariyeh.   This,  however,   seems  very  unlikely   as  the  road  reaches 

53.  During  the  rainy  season  the  plain  is  very  muddy  and  in  the  middle  is  often  impassable, 
owing  to  the  feet  that  the  drainage  from  the  plain  cannot  be  readily  carried  off".  However,  by 
the  time  Thutmose  reached  this  region  in  May,  most  of  the  plain  would  have  been  dry  enough 
to  allow  of  the    free  use  of  chariots  upon  the  level,  cultivated  fields. 

54.  The  advice  of  the  officers  would  seem  to  have  been  dictated  by  ordinary  military  pru- 
dence, and  we  cannot  but  feel  that  Thutmose  was  assuming  grave  responsibilities  and  taking 
great  risks  when    he   disregarded  it.    The  king's  choice,   however,  was  justified  by  the   event. 


28  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 

the  plain  only  a  short  distance  from  Megiddo  and  would  have  been  open 
to  practically  the  same  disadvantages  as  was  the  direct  road  to  Megid- 
do. Moreover,  as  '  Aruna  probably  lay  near  the  junction  of  these  two 
roads,  the  term  "  'Aruna  Road",  used  constantly  throughout  the  Annals 
to  apply  to  the  middle  one  of  the  three  chief  roads,  might  equally  well 
apply  to  either  of  these  two  roads.  The  Annalist  would  most  probably 
have  used  some  other  term  to  apply  to  the  road  that  issued  at  Megiddo, 
^the  third  road)  had  he  been  contrasting  it  with  the  road  to  Tell  el- 
Aghbariyeh  /'the  second,  road).  The  road  from  Tell  el-Asawir  to  Tell 
Kaimun  seems  most  likely  to  have  been  the  "road  north  of  Zefti",  be- 
ing the  counterpart  on  the  north  to  the  road  around  the  southern  end  of 
the  Ridge  towards  Taanach.  The  only  other  route,  that  around  the 
seaward  endof  Carmel,  is  too  great  a  detour  to  have  been  seriously  con- 
sidered. By  taking  the  road  issuing  from  the  mountains  at  Tell  Kaimun, 
the  advantages  mentioned  as  being  derived  from  the  use  of  the  fourth 
road  would  be  equally  well  secured,  except  thtit  the  fourth  road  is  some- 
what easier  for  chariots.  In  any  case  it  is  obvious  that  the  officers  de- 
sired to  reach  the  open  country  on  the  other  side  of  the  Ridge  before 
encountering  the  enemy,  hence  their  very  evident  reluctance  to  follow 
the  Pharaoh  along  the  direct  road  to  Megiddo. 

In  answer  to  the  objections  of  his  officers,  Thutmose's  anger  blazed 
up.  His  reply  is  one  of  the  most  remarkable  royal  utterances  in  all  the 
range  of  ancient  oriental  records  and  fairly  rings  not  only  with  wrath 
but  also  with  contempt.  We  can  picture  to  ourselves  the  Pharaoh  ris- 
ing from  his  seat  as  he  ends  the  council  in  disgust  and  with  scorn  bid- 
ding those  of  his  officers  who  are  afraid  to  accompany  him  follow  the 
road  their  fears  dictate,  but  calling  upon  those  who  would  stand  by  him 
to  follow  his  lead,  adding,  as  a  final  rebuke,  "They  shall  not  think 
among  the  enemy  whom  Re  detests,  'Does  his  Majesty  proceed  upon 
another  road  because  he  is  beginning  to  fear  us?' "  It  is  the  first  instance 
in  history  of  one  born  to  lead  calling  upon  him  who  will  to  follow  him 
into  danger  or  be  forever  branded  a  coward.  And  in  the  reply  of  the 
officers  we  hear  not  only  the  abject  submission  of  the  courtier  who  has 
offended  royalty,  but  the  shamed  acquiescence  of  the  soldier  caught  in  a 
situation  where  he  may  be  accused  of  cowardice;  "Behold  us  as  the  fol- 
lowing of  thy  Majesty  in  whatever  place  thy  Majesty  proceeds." 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  29 


III 

THE   CROSSING   OF    THE   CARMEL   RIDGE 
THE   ANNALS,  LINES   49-84 

Urk.  652     [His  Majesty  commanded  to   issue]   (50)  orders  to  the  entire 

army ^^  (51)  this  road   which   was   becoming  narrow. 

[Behold  his  Majesty  took]  (52)  an  oath,  saying,  "I  will  not  per- 
mit [my  victorious  army]  to  set  out  (53)  in  advance  of  my  Majes- 
ty."  56   (54)   He   set   out   in  advance  of  his   troops 

himself.  [Every  man]  was  assigned  (55)  his  position,^'  horse 
behind  horse,  [his  Majesty]  being  (56)  at  the  head  of  his  troops. 

Year  23,  first  month  of  the  third  season,  day  19;  the  watch  in 
[life]58  (57)  at  the  royal  tent  was  at  the  city  of  'Aruna.  My 
Majesty  proceeded  (58)  northward,  bearing^^  his  father  Amon- 
Re.  Lord    of  Thebes,    [who   opened    the    way]  (59)    before   me, 

5  5-  Sethe's  restoration  would  read;  "Your  victorious  lord  will  protect  your  footsteps  upon 
this  road,  etc." 

56.  Sethe  restores;    "Now  his  Majesty  proposed  (rdy-n)  in  his  heart  that  he  set    out'". 

57.  Lit.  "His  steps  of  marching". 

58.  A  technical  phrase.  It  occurs  again  in  Urk.  iv,  656,  13,  and  also  in  Ramses  II's  re- 
cord ot"  the  Kadesh  campaign  ( Breasted,  Battle  of  KaJei/i,  p.  18.)  The  second  occurance  in 
the  Annals  is  prob.ibly  Sethe's  authority  for  the  restoration  of  "life"  in  the  present  passage.  In 
Ramses'  inscription  the  phrase  reads,  "The  goodly  watch  in  life,  prosperity  and  health  in  the 
rent  of  his  Majesty  was  on  the  height  south  of  Kedesh."  Ramses'  phrase  is  obviously  the  com- 
plete form,  which  is  abbreviated  in  the  Annals.  I  take  it  that  the  "Watch  in  life,  prosperity  and 
health"  is  a  technical  phrase  for  jthe  royal  body-guard  or  the  guard  especially  det.iiled  to  pro- 
tect the  roval  tent.  In  that  case,  both  here  and  in  Urk.  IV,  656,  13,  we  may  have  a  nominal 
sentence  which  would  read,  "The  watch  in  life  was  in  the  tent  of  the  kii.g".  .As  such  a  guard 
would  undoubtedly  be  stationed  as  soon  as  the  king's  tent  was  pitched  at  the  lime  of  setting  up 
camp,  the  phrase  in  our  text  would  then  become  equivalent  to  "The  camp  was  pitched  at 
'Aruna".     On  the  restoration  of  *nh  in  the  text,  see  Breasted,  Ancient  Records  II,  425,  note  a. 

^9.  Lit.  "under".  Wr  sometimes  contams  so  much  of  the  idea  of  motion  that  it  is 
construed  with  the  preposition  r,  as  !n  Urk.  IV,  p.  310,  where  b'  is  used  of  carrying  the  sacred 
image  of  Amon  ( kr  )t-f  Tmn  r  hb-f )  across  the  river  to  one  of  his  great  feasts  It  is  not  neces- 
sary to  translate  the  passage  "under  the  protection  of"  as  does  Breasted,  Ancient  Records,  II,  425, 
nor  to  omit  the  s-gn  altogether  as  Masuero,  Recueil,  II,  p.  56.  The  same  word,  hr,  is  used  of 
transporting  Amon-of-the-Ways  in  the  Report  of  Wcnamon;  see  RecucH,  XXI,  p  8g. 


30  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 

Urk.  653Herakhte    was (90)   my   father   Amon 

strength  of  sword (61)  my  Majesty. 

His  Majesty  went  forth  [at  the  head  of]  his  [troops]  prepared 

(62)   in    numerous  battle-array one.     [Their]    (63) 

south  wing  was  atTaanach,  [while  their]  (64)  north  wing  was 
at  the  southern  corner  of  [the  valley  of  the  Kina.^^  Then]  (65) 

his  Majesty  cried   out  upon (66)   They   are   fallen. 

Now,  that  [wretched]  enemy (67) 

Urk.  654... (68) Amon  (69) ye 

of  (70) his  Majesty  for  his  might  more  than  (71)  ... 

Troops  of  his  Majesty  in  (72)  'Aruna. 

Now  the  rearguard  of  the  victorious  troops  of  his  Majesty 
was  at  the  [city]  of  (73)  'Aruna  when  the  vanguard  issued  at 
the  valley  of  the  Kina.  (74)  They  filled  the  mouth  of  the  valley. 

Then  they  said  in  the  presence  of  his  Majesty,  L.  P.  H. ,  (75) 
"Behold,  his  Majesty  goes  forth  together  with  his  victorious 
troops  and  they  fill  the  (76)  valley.  Let  our  victorious  lord  har- 
ken  to  us  this  time  (77)  and  let  our  lord  guard  for  us  the  rear 
Urk.  655  of  his  troops  and  his  people.  (78)  When  the  rear  of  the  troops 
goes  forth  for  us,  then  we  shall  fight  against  (79)  these  Asiatics; 
then  we  shall  not  give  thought  [to]  the  rear  of  (80)  our  army.''^! 

His  Majesty  halted  outside,  waiting (81)  there,  guarding 

the  rear  of  his  victorious  army. 

Now  the  rear  of  the  expedition  (82)  was  going  out  upon  this 
road,  when  the  shadow  turned,  (83)  and  his  Majesty  arrived  at 
the  south  of  Megiddo  on  the  bank  of  the  Brook  Kina,  when  it 
was  seven  hours  from  the  turning  by  the  sun. 

Then  the  camp  of  his  Majesty  was  pitched  there  and  com- 
Urk.  656  mand  was  given  to  the  entire  army,  saying,  "Prepare  your- 
selves; make  ready  your  weapons,  for  one  is  to  advcince  to  fight 
with  this  wretched  enemy  in  the  morning."  Wherefore  one  was 


60.  The  portion  of  the  text  preserved  may  also  read,  "Their  south  wing  was  at  the  corner 
south  of".  Sethe  restores;  "south  oi  the  Brook  A'/«a,"  which  restoration  1  have,  in  part,  follow- 
ed for  reasons  given  later.  As  far  as  the  size  of  the  lacuna  goes  the  ori^jinal  might  have  read, 
"south  of  the  city  of  Meg^iddo. 

61.  This  passage  must  be  added  to  those  cited  by  Breasted,  Andent  Records,  II,  ^9,  noted, 
as  instances  of  a  real  patriotic  feeling  evinced  by  the  use   of  the  phrase  "our  troops". 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  31 

proceeding  (84)  to  rest  in  the  royal  tent.  The  officers  were  pro- 
vided for.^2  Provisions  for  the  court  were  secured.  The  sentries 
of  the  army  made  the  rounds. ^3  They  said,  "Steadfast!  Stead- 
fast! Watchful!  Watchful!"  The  watch  in  life  was  at  the  royal 
tent.  One  came  to  report  to  his  Majesty,  "The  land  is  well;^'* 
the  troops  of  the  north  and  the  south  likewise." 

When  the  council  had  broken  up,  the  king  gave  orders  to  set  out  on 
the  'Aruna  road.  It  is  significant  that  the  records  so  strongly  emphasize 
the  fact  that  the  king  led  the  line  of  march  in  person.  After  the  vigoi-ous 
repremand  he  had  given  his  officers  at  the  council,  he  could  do  no  less 
than  occupy  the  place  of  danger  himself.  He  would  thereby  also  be  able 
the  better  to  prevent  any  surprise  by  the  enemy  and  would  encourage 
his  men  by  his  own  example.  So,  the  necessary  orders  having  been  giv- 
en for  the  disposition  of  the  troops  during  the  crossing  of  the  mountains, 
the  army  set-  out. 

At  the  most  commanding  position  in  the  pass  lies  the  modern  village  of 
'Ar'arah,  which  has  been  identified  with  the  ancient  'Aruna. ^^  j^ 
support  of  this  identification  it  may  be  argued  that;  first,  if  the  road 
running  from  Tell  el-Asawir  to  Megiddo  is  the  'Aruna  road  re- 
ferred to  in  the  Annals,  then  somewhere  along  the  course  of  the  road  we 
must  look  for  the  city  of  'Aruna  as  occupying  a  prominent  position.  Sec- 
ond, the  city  must  have  lain  well  within  the  pass,  for  the  Egyptians 
had  already  been  compelled  to  assume  a  single  file  formation  before  they 
reached  'Aruna.  Third,  the  distance  of  'Aruna  from  Megiddo  is  about 
half  a  day's  march  for  an  army,  which  we  know  from  the  Annals  was 
not  more  than  about  seven  or  eight  miles  at  the  farthest. ^^  We 
must  assume  that  the  Egyptians  would  push  on  as  fast  as  possible 
through  this  mountain  defile  so  as  to  free  themselves  from  the  danger  of 
attack  as  soon  as  possible,  but  at  the    same  time  they  would  have   been 

6i.    On  miirzusee  Gardiner,  Admonitions,  p.    102-103 

63.  Lit. ''passed  by,    crossed  over''. 

64.  This  word,  mrnv,  "waste,  might  perhaps  refer  to  the  source  from  wliich  some  of  the 
troops  were  drawn.  In  that  case  they  wouU'  be  the  auxiliary  troops  from  the  fringe  ot  the  desert. 
But  if  this  surmise  were  correct,  wliy  are  they  mentioned  before  the  regular  troops,  thejw'yf 
of  the  south  and  north.' 

65.  Wiedemann,   Aegypt.   Geschichte,  p.    347.      Petrie  Hi>t.,  <]f'  Egypt  II,  p.  325. 

66.  The  distance  from  Tharu  to  Gaza  is  about  125  miles.  This  the  Egyptians  covered  in 
nine  davs,   m, iking  an  averaj;e  of  fourteen  miles  a  day. 


32  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 

hindered  from  making  their  best  time  by  the  confined  nature  of  the  road. 
Fourth,  there  must  have  been  sufficient  room  and  a  sufficient  water  supply 
at  'Aruna  to  allow  of  the  Egyptian  army  having  camped  there  one  night. 
These  conditions  are  all  satisfied  by  the  location  of 'Ar'arah.  For,  first, 
it  occupies  the  most  prominent  position  in  the  pass,  just  at  the  junction 
of  the  road  to  Tell  el-Aghbariyeh  with  that  to  Megiddo  and  is  surround- 
ed with  sufficient  cultivable  land  to  support  a  fair  sized  population.  Sec- 
ond, it  lies  well  within  the  pass,  being  about  two  hours' journey  from 
the  mouth.  Third,  it  is  about  seven  or  eight  miles  from  Megiddo,  just  the 
maximum  distance  we  would  suppose  the  Egyptians  to  have  travelled 
between  'Aruna  and  Megiddo.  Fourth,  it  is  abundantly  supplied  with 
water,  and  is  located  in  an  opening  in  the  wady  large  enough  to  accom- 
modate a  considerable  body  of  troops  (see  View  II).  From  these  consid- 
erations it  seems  reasonably  certain  that  'Aruna  must  have  lain  some- 
where near  the  site  of  the  village  'Ar'arah.  Etymologioally,  however,  it 
seems  hardly  possible  to  equate  'Aruna("-rw-7i'J  with  'Ar'arah  (•^cjc). 

If  we  are  right  in  this  identification  of  'Aruna  with  the  modern  'Ar- 
'arah, then  shortly  after  leaving  Yehem  the  host  would  have  entered 
the  mouth  of  the  Wady  'Arah  and  would  have  found  itself  in  the  situa- 
tion which  the  officers  of  the  army  dreaded  so  much,  where  it  was  im- 
possible to  maintain  any  other  than  a  long-drawn-out  line  of  march. 
With  this  necessity  of  the  topography  the  account  in  the  Annals  entire- 
ly agrees,  for  upon  leaving  Yehem,  the  Egyptians  are  said  to  have  march- 
ed, at  once,  "horse  behind  horse",  in  the  single  file  formation  that  the  nar- 
row valley  demanded.  It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  even  on  the  coast  plain 
from  Gaza  to  Yehem  the  army  had  marched  in  any  other  than  column 
formation.  In  most  parts  of  the  valley  also  this  formation  could  be  more 
or  less  maintained.  If,  however,  the  enemy  had  attacked  the  army  in  the 
open  plain,  it  would  have  been  possible  for  the  Egyptians  to  have  formed 
in  some  sort  of  battle-array.  In  the  mountain  pass,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  long,  straggling  column  necessitated  by  the  narrow  road  could  not 
have  been  organized  into  any  sort  of  formation.  It  is  on  this  account 
that  the  record  so  strongly  emphasizes  the  straggling  line  which  the 
country  necessitated. 

On  the  thirteenth  day  of  the  month  (May  12th)  the  Egyptians  were 
at  'Aruna,  that  is,  on  the  third  day  after  they  are  recorded  to  have  been 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  33 

at  Yehem.  We  are  not  to  suppose  that  it  took  three  days  to  cover  the 
distance  between  the  two  towns.  If  we  are  right  in  pvitting  yehem 
somewhere  near  tlie  junction  of  the  three  roads  across  the  Ridge,  it 
would  not  have  taken  more  than  one  day  for  the  army  to  have  reached 
'  Aruna.  It  is  possible  that  the  spies  sent  out  to  locate  the  enemy  were 
not  dispatched  till  after  Yehem  was  reached,  in  which  case  it  would 
have  been  necessary  for  the  king  to  wait  a  day  or  two  at  Yehem  for 
their  return.  It  is  not  necessary  to  suppose  that  the  council  was  called 
on  the  sixteenth.  That  date  possibly  indicates  the  time  of  arrival  at  the 
city,  at  which  the  king  may  have  remained  for  several  days.  We  must 
suppose  that  as  soon  as  possible  after  the  announcement  of  the  king's 
decision  to  cross  the  Ridge  directly  to  Megiddo,  the  advance  was  begun, 
for  there  would  have  been  no  object  in  delay,  as  far  as  our  information 
goes.  The  nineteenth  of  the  month  was  therefore  occupied  in  the  march 
to  'Aruna,  at  which  place  the  Egyptians  camped  that  night.  Provided 
the  location  of  Yehem  as  given  above  is  in  general  correct,  it  would  have 
been  possible  for  the  king  to  have  pushed  on  further  that  night  before 
camping.  But  in  that  case  nightfall  would,  in  all  probability,  have  found 
the  army  still  toiling  through  the  pass,  and  they  would  have  been  com- 
pelled to  halt  so  near  to  Megiddo  that  their  camp  would  have  been 
exposed  to  attack  by  the  enemy  had  the  latter  been  vigilant.  Moreover, 
at  'Aruna  there  was  a  good  camping-place  (see  page  10)  with  plenty 
of  water,  a  favorable  situation  found  nowhere  else  on  the  road.  Fur- 
thermore, the  distance  from  'Aruna  to  Megiddo,  as  shown  by  the  time 
occupied  in  crossing  the  pass  the  next  day,  was  just  about  enough  to 
allow  the  Pharaoh  to  get  his  entire  army  through  the  mountains  in 
the  course  of  the  day  and  enable  them  to  prepare  for  battle  on  the 
morrow. 

In  the  passage  of  the  mountains  the  king  led  the  way  accompanied 
by,  or,  in  the  words  of  the  Annals,  "bearing"  his  father,  Amon.  This  is 
the  only  instance  I  know  of  in  Egyptian  records  where  we  are  told  that 
statues  or  images  of  the  gods  were  carried  into  battle,  as  the  Hebrews 
carried  the  ark.  The  image  of  Amon  in  its  portable  shrine,  born  on  the 
shoulders  of  a  body  of  priests,  undoubtedly  accompanied  the  van  of  the 
army  where  was  the  king's  chariot  and  "opened  the  way"  before  his 
Majesty.    On  the  walls  at  Medinet   Habu  is  a  relief  depicting  the  de- 


34 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo 


parture  ofRamses  III  for  the  first  Lybian  campaign. ^'^  Before  the  king  is 
a  chariot  bearing  the  standard  of  Amon,  a  ram's  head  surmounted  by 
the  sun-disk,  the  whole  supported  on  a  pole  attached  to  the  chariot 
(see  Fig.  I).  Above  the  chariot  is  an  inscription  which  reads:  "Ut- 
terance of  Amon-Re,  king  of  gods:  'Lo,  I  am  before  thee,  lord  of  the 
Two  Lands,  Usermare-Meriamon.  I  give  [to  thee]  all  [might  and  power] 

among  the  Nine  Bows;  terror their  chiefs,  I  will   open  [  for] 

thee  the  ways  of  the  land  of  Temeh.  I  will  trample  them  before  thy 
horses.' "68  n  jg  interesting  that  this  phrase  "open  the  ways",  so  com- 
mon in   the   inscriptions,   should   be  so  graphically   illustrated   by  the 


Figure   I.    From  Gressmann,  Altorientalische  Texte  und   Bilder,  II,  p.    ^4. 

chariot  of  Amon  preceding  the  king  along  the  road  to  Lybia.  Is  it  not 
more  than  likely  that  in  Thutmose's  inscription,  where  the  king  is  said 
to  be  carrying  his  father  Amon  who  in  turn  "opens  the  way"  before  him, 
we  have  just  such  another  scene  as  that  shown  at  Medinet  Habu. 
We     know    of   instances    where    portable    cult    images   were   carried 

67.  Champollion,  Alinuments,  217.   Rosellini,  Alonumenti  i^torici,   124. 

68.  Breasted,  y4ncient  Records,  IV,  49. 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  35 

far  from  Egypt,  such  as  the  image  of  Khonsu  which  was  sent  to  the 
land  of  the  Hittites  by  Ramses  II,  ^9  or  the  image  of  Amon-of-the-Way 
that  Wenamon  carried  to  the  king  of  Byblosjo  The  divine  names  given 
to  the  four  divisions  of  Ramses  II's  army  on  the  campaign  of  Kadesh'^i 
suggest  that  perhaps  each  division  of  the  army  bore  an  image  of  the 
deity  under  whose  special  protection  it  marched.  Thutmose  III,  who 
owed  his  elevation  to  the  throne  to  the  intervention  of  Amon,  might 
well  emphasize  the  presence  of  the  deity  at  the  head  of  the  expedition 
which  was  being  carried  on  ostensibly  at  the  god's  command. 

The  fragmentary  condition  of  lines  61-71  makes  it  impossible  to  deter- 
mine clearly  the  connection  between  the  portions  of  the  text  that  still 
survive.  It  is  evident,  however,  that  with  the  words,  "pr-t  yn  h  m-f", 
that  is,  "His  Majesty  went  forth",  in  line  61,  the  Egyptians  had  reached 
the  mouth  of  the  pass  and  were  about  to  make  their  exit  into  the  open 
plain  by  the  Kina.  The  "going-forth"  was  undoubtedly  from  the  narrow 
mountain  defile.  As  the  mouth  of  the  valley  was  reached,  the  Egyptian 
vanguard  formed  in  battle-line,  ready  to  resist  any  attack  by  the  Asia- 
tics and  to  cover  the  main  body  of  the  army  still  pushing  through  the 
mountains  behind. '2 

On  thus  issuing  from  the  mountains  the  king,  to  judge  from  the  re- 
maining fi-agments  of  the  inscription,  called  out  to  his  troops  as  he  descri- 
ed the  Asiatics  across  the  Kina.  The  few  words,  "They  are  fallen.  Now 
this    wretched   enemy",  suggest  such  an    interpretation  and,  the  second 

69.  of),   lit.,    Ill,  419  ff. 

70.  op.   lit.,    IV,   557  ft' 

71.  op.   lit.,   Ill,   310  ft". 

72.  Until  the  appearance  of  the  Urkunden  there  was  no  certainty  as  to  who  "went  forth". 
Masoero  has  supplied  a  //w-sign  after  pr-t  yn,  but,  at  best,  it  was  a  restoration.  Owing  to  the 
fact  that  the  statement  which  immediately  follows  undoubtedly  refers  to  the  disposition  of  the 
Asiatic  forces,  Breasted,  Ancient  RecorJi  II,  416,  interpreted  the  words  pr-t  yn  as  applving  to  the 
Asiatics.  He  therefore  concluded  that  ttiere  h.\d  been  an  engagement  in  the  mountains  between 
the  Egyptians  ana  the  Allies.  Hall,  Anc.  Hin.  of  the  Near  East,  p.  237,  says  "The  people 
of  the  village  of  Aruna  *******  attacked  the  troops  on  the  next  day,  and  caused  con- 
siderable annoyance  to  the  rearguard,  which  was  fighting  near  Aruna  while  the  king  with  the  van 
had  crossed  the  head  of  the  pass  without  resistance  and  was  descending  the  slope  of  the  Ruhah 
towards  Megiddo."  Since  the  publication  of  the  Urkunden,  Maspero's  restoration  is  seen  to 
have  been  correct,  for  Sethe  has  found  on  the  walls  at  Karnak  the  traces  of  a  /w-sign,  showing 
that  it  was  the  king,  not  the  Allies,  that  went  torth  in  battle-array.  Therefore  Breasted's  battle 
in  the  mountains  must  be  given  uu.  Hall's  statement  in  regard  to  the  rearguard  fighting  while 
the  van  was  already  across  the  mountains  is  not  at  ill  supported  bv  the  inscriptions,  which  make 
no  mention  ot  any  such  situation.  In  fact,  all  through  this  section  of  the  Annals  the  fear  of  the 
Eirvptians  is  constantly  that  just  the  opposite  will  occur  and  that  the  van  will  be  fighting  while 
the  rear  are  still  in  'Aruna  without  having  fought. 


36  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 

person  plural  pronominal  suffix  preserved  in  line  69  would  indicate  that 
the  M'^ords  were  addressed  to  those  about  the  speaker.  The  object  of 
what  was  said  seems  to  have  been  to  encourage  the  troops  and  perhaps 
to  point  out  the  successful  accomplishment  of  the  royal  plan  which  the 
officers  had  opposed  at  Yehem. 

After  the  words  "numerous  battle-array"  Sethe  would  supply  "n 
gmn-f  hry  iv'  ",  that  is,  "not  did  he  find  a  single  enemy", '3  all  of. which 
sentence  is  pui'e  restoration  except  the  word  translated  "single".  Despite 
the  fact  that  the  restoration  seems  exactly  to  fill  the  lacuna,  there  is 
far  too  little  ground  for  assuming  that  those  particular  words  are  what 
occupied  the  break.  For  historical  purposes  restorations  which  do  not 
materially  modify  the  meaning  of  a  passage  may  be  accepted  with  re- 
serve even  on  comparatively  slight  evidence,  but  to  add  the  statement 
of  a  fact  of  such  historical  importance  as  the  denial  of  any  conflict  with 
the  enemy  in  a  place  where  such  a  conflict  would  naturally  be  expected, 
and  that  merely  on  the  strength  of  a  single  word  which  does  not  in  it- 
self contain  any  clue  to  the  nature  of  the  lost  passage,  is  too  great  a 
liberty  with  the  text  to  be  accepted,  even  if  the  restoration  does  just 
fill  the  lacuna.  The  fact  that  there  is  no  mention  of  a  meeting  with  the 
enemy,  as  far  as  the  surviving  portions  of  the  text  go,  does  not  warrant 
the  insertion  of  a  denial  of  such  an  encounter.  The  best  that  we  can  do 
with  this  passage  is  to  say  that  we  do  not  know  what  occupied  the 
lacuna. 

The  statement  that  "The  southern  wing  (lit.  "horn")  was  at  Taanach 

while  the  northern  wing  was  at   the  corner "  can  refer  only   to 

the  disposition  of  the  Asiatic  force,  as  Breasted  has  pointed  out.'"*  It  is 
obvious  that  the  enemy  had  miscalculated  the  movements  of  the  Egyp- 
tian army  and  expected  them  to  advance  by  the  road  around  the  south- 
ern end  of  the  Ridge  and  so  to  approach  Megiddo  from  the  direction  of 
Taanach.  The  Annalist  is  evidently  describing  the  Asiatic  lines  as  extend- 
ing from  Taanach   on  the  south  to   "the   corner "   on    the   north. 

Sethe's  restoration  here,  "the  corner  of  the  valley  of  the  Kina",  though 
still  only  a  surmise,  is  possible,  for  we  can  hardly  beli(>ve  that  the  Asia- 
tics would  have  left  Megiddo  entirely  undefended,  and  if  one  end  of  their 

73.  Urk.  IV,  653. 

74.  Aticieiit  Records,   II,  426,   note  d. 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  37 

line  reached  to  the  valley  of  the  Kina,  which  flows  by  Megiddo,  they 
would  thus  be  in  some  position  to  defend  the  city.  On  this  hypothesis 
we  must  suppose  that  the  main  body  was  somewhere  on  the  road  be- 
tween Taanach  and  Megiddo  with  its  probably  detached  extremities  at 
either  city,  these  outposts  being  the  "wings"  of  the  Annalist.  They  were 
thus  prepared  to  mass  their  forces  at  either  point  according  as  the 
Egyptians  advanced  by  Taanach  or  by  the  'Aruna  road  direct  to  Megid- 
do. Still  it  is  astonishing  how  little  military  wisdom  the  Asiatics  seem 
to  have  displayed  throughout  this  whole  campaign.  They  took  no  ad- 
vantage apparently  of  the  opportunity  for  harassing  the  Egyptians  of- 
fered by  the  narrow  mountain  pass.  In  fact,  as  far  as  we  can  see,  they 
were  unaware  of  which  road  Thutmose  had  chosen,  until  the  Egyptians 
were  almost  at  Megiddo.  It  seems  to  me  that  we  must  reach  this  con- 
clusion if  we  suppose  that  they  allowed  the  Egyptians  to  ci-oss  the 
mountains  without  attacking  them  in  the  narrow  defile.  At  no  time 
th-oughout  the  campaign  were  their  chances  of  successful  resistance  to 
the  invader  so  bright  as  when  the  Egyptian  force  was  winding  about 
among  the  hills,  and  this  great  opportunity  they  seem  deliberately  to 
have  neglected.  However,  when  our  sources  are  so  meagre  and  are  also 
written  from  the  enemy's  standpoint,  we  cannot  be  positive  on  such  a 
point. 

The  Annalist  informs  us  that  when  the  vanguard  of  the  Egyptians 
had  reached  the  opening  of  the  pass,  the  rearguard  was  still  far  behind 
on  the  other  side  of  the  Ridge  at  'Aruna,  the  point  from  which  the  army 
had  set  out  in  the  morning.  The  officep  who  accompanied  the  king  at 
the  head  of  the  army  must  have  watched  the  opening  of  the  valley  with 
anxious  eyes  to  catch  a  glimpse  of  the  whereabouts  of  the  enemy  and 
to  make  svire  that  their  fears,  as  expressed  at  the  council  at  Yehem,  were 
not  about  to  be  realized.  As  the  army  turned  the  last  bend  of  the  road, 
several  hundred  yards  before  it  enters  upon  the  plain,  they  found  that 
the  valley  spread  out  to  a  couple  of  hundred  yards  in  width  while  the 
slopes  of  the  hills  rose  gently  on  either  hand.  The  eager  troops  behind, 
pushing  rapidly  forward,  not  only  to  see  what  lay  ahead,  but  also,  no 
doubt,  to  free  themselves  from  the  dangerous  position  in  which  the  nar- 
rowness of  the  pass  placed  them,  soon  filled  the  mouth  of  the  valley 
(see  View  I V)i  and,  we  must  suppose,  in  the  case  of  the  infantry,  even 


38  The  Battle  of  Megtddo 

the  slopes  of  the  hills.  What  they  saw  before  them  was  the  wide  expanse 
of  level  land,  probably  covered  with  ripening  harvests,  stretching  for 
half  a  mile  to  the  banks  of  the  Kina,  and  beyond,  about  a  mile  away,  the 
walls  of  Megiddo,  the  stronghold  of  the  enemy  and  their  own  objective 
(see  View  V).  And  beyond  the  city  lay  the  fertile  plain  of  Esdraelon, 
with  its  grain  fields  and  orchards,  extending  away  to  the  blue  hills  of 
Galilee.  No  doubt  between  the  Egyptians  and  the  open  plain  was  the 
northern  wing  of  the  Asiatic  army,  now  probably  in  great  commotion 
as  they  realized  that  their  enemy  had  done  the  thing  they  had  not  cal- 
culated on  and  had  surprised  them  with  the  bulk  of  their  force  far  down  the 
road  towards  Taanach.  And  no  doubt  in  the  Egyptian  ranks  many  an 
officer  and  private  looked  with  longing  eyes  at  the  open  spaces  of  the 
great  plain  between  which  and  themselves  lay  the  enemy,  and  thought 
with  fear  of  the  long,  straggling  line  of  troops  hastening  over  the  hills  at 
the  mercy  of  any  strong  force  which  might  swoop  down  on  them  from 
the  heights  on  either  hand. 

At  this  point  the  officers  plucked  up  courage  to  make  one  further  re- 
quest of  the  king.  "Let  our  victorious  lord  harken  to  us  this  time",  they 
said,  even  though  he  had  seen  fit  to  disregard  their  advice  at  Yehem. 
They  then  called  Thutmose's  attention  to  the  troops  behind  him,  who 
were  gradually  filling  the  mouth  of  the  valley,  as  one  by  one  the  com- 
panies of  infantry  and  "squadrons"  of  chariotry  filed  out  of  the  narrow 
road  and  took  up  their  positions  in  the  rear  of  the  waiting  vanguard. 
They  urged  the  king  to  wait  at  the  mouth  of  the  pass  till  all  his  troops 
had  arrived,  so  that  when  the  army  finally  emerged  into  the  open,  they 
might  give  all  their  attention  to  the  enemy  in  front  and  m'ght  not  have 
to  weaken  their  strength  by  being  compelled  to  detach  a  portion  of  their 
force  to  cover  the  arrival  of  the  straggling  rear.  Now  that  Thutmose 
had  actually  reached  Megiddo  and  had  shown  the  feasibility  of  his  own 
plan  of  campaign,  he  seems  to  have  consented  willingly  to  their  suggestion, 
also,  no  doubt,  realizing  the  wisdom  of  not  dividing  his  army  in  the  face 
of  the  enemy.  By  stationing  a  suffic'ent  force  on  the  hills  on  either  side 
of  the  mouth  of  the  valley,  he  could  command  a  strong  position.  On  his 
left  was  a  long  ridge,  (marked  D  on  Map  II)  two  or  three  hundred  feet 
high,  which  sloped  down  on  the  south  into  the  valley  in  which  the 
army  then  stood,  and  on  the  north  was  protected  by  th(>  wide   openuig 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  39 

of  Wady  es-Sitt  (see  View  X).  On  (he  south  of  the  valley-mouth  was 
another  equally  high  hill  (marked  E  on  Map  II)  which,  though  hound- 
ed by  a  more  shallow  wady  on  the  other  si(i(\  could  still  be  held  against 
the  attack  of  a  large  force.  With  these  two  heights  in  his  possession, 
and  we  cannot  suppose  that  he  failed  to  seize  them  at  once,  and  with 
his  vanguard,  undoubtedly  composed  of  picked  troops,  facing  the  enemy 
in  front,  he  might  feel  reasonably  safe  from  any  attack  by  his  foes  until 
the  rearguard  had  finally  made  its  passage  of  the  mountains.  By  grad- 
ually advancing  his  front  into  the  open  but  still  keeping  the  mouth  of 
the  valley  well  covered,  he  could  make  room  for  the  fresh  arrivals  as 
they  came  up,  until,  when  all  ttad  safely  crossed,  he  could  advance  bold- 
ly with  all  his  force  into  the  fields  bordering  on  the  Kina. 

At  this  point  in  his  narrative  the  Annalist  furnishes  us  with  a  most 
interesting  datum.  He  says  :  "Now  when  the  rear  of  the  expedition  was 
setting  out  upon  this  road,  the  shadow  turned;  and  his  Majesty  arrived 
at  the  south  of  Megiddo  on  the  bank  of  the  brook  Kina,  when  it  was 
seven  hours  from  the  turning  (measured)  by  the  sun."  So  far  as  I  know 
this  is  the  only  instance  in  the  Egyptian  records  where  an  event  is 
timed,  as  we  to-day  would  time  it,  by  the  hours  of  the  day.  Taking  this 
passage  in  conjunction  with  Borchardt's  study  of  Egyptian  sun-clocks,'^ 
we  are  able  to  ascertain  the  time  of  the  king's  arrival  at  his  camping- 
place  down  to  the  very  hour  of  the  day.  Borchardt's  article  is  based  on 
the  study  of  the  remains  of  two  such  clocks,  one  of  which  bears  the  in- 
scription: "Living  Horus,  Mighty  Bull  Shining  in  Thebes,  the  Beloved 
of  the  Two  Goddesses,   etc.  etc..    King  of  Upper   and     Lower  Egypt, 

Menkheperre  (Thutmose  HI),  Son  of  Re, ",    showing  that  in  the 

reign  of  Thutmose  III  such  instruments  for  measuring  time  by  the  sun's 
shadow  were  already  in  use.  According  to  Borchardt's  reconstruction 
(see  Fig.  II)  the  instrument  was  placed  so  that  the  transverse  piece  A-B 
lay  in  a  north-south  direction,  while  the  longitudinal  section  C-D  would 
then  extend  in  an  east-west  line.  The  shadow  cast  by  A-B  on  C-D  would 
gradually  shorten  as  the  sun  rose,  until  at  noon  time,  when  the  sun 
stood  directly  over  head,  there  would  be  no  shadow  upon  C-D  at  all. 
The  longitudinal  section  was  divided  into  six  parts  to  correspond  to  the 
six  hours  of  the  morning,  and  as  the  shadow  cast  by  A-B  retreated  from 

75.    Botchardt,  "Alti.gyptische  Sonnenulirfu",  AZ,  48    (1911),  p    9  fF. 


40 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo 


one  of  these  parts  to  another  the  observer  could  ascertain  with  tolerable 
exactness  the  time  of  day.  To  tell  the  afternoon  hours  it  was  necessary 
to  reverse  the  instrument  so  that  it  would  face  the  west,  and  the  pro- 
gress of  the  hours  would  then  be  indicated  by  the  lengthening  of  the 
shadow  cast  by  the  transverse  A-B  upon  C-D. 

This  brief  summary  of  Borchardt's  reconstruction  of  the  working  of 
Egyptian  sun-clocks  gives  us  the  data  necessary  for  the  vmderstanding 
of  the  Annalist's  statement  that  the  shadow  turned.  Obviously   by  this 


Figure  II.    From  Zeitschrift  tur  agvptische  Sprache,  48   (191  1),  Tatel  2. 


phrase  he  referred  to  the  time  at  which  the  shadow,  instead  of  with- 
drawing towards  C,  turned  around,  as  it  were,  and  began  to  lengthen 
out  towards  D  after  the  reversal  of  the  clock.  The  turning  of  the  shadow 
would  then  indicate  noon,  the  hours  before  the  shadow  turned  belonging 
to  the  morning,  and  those  after  the  shadow  turned  to  the  afternoon.  The 
turning  of  the  shadow  cannot  very  well  apply  to  sunrise,  and  so  many 
hours  after  the  turning  would  therefore  not  refer  to  the  morning  hours. 
To  speak  of  the  shadow  turning  instead  of  the  clock  being  turned  would 
be  no  more  inconsistent  than  are  many  of  the  terms  in  popular  use  to- 
day, as  when  we  speak  of  the  sun  going  down,  etc.  It  is  evident  that 
the  rearguard  of  the  Egyptians  left '  Aruna  at  noon  or  shortly  after,  that 
is,  when  the  shadow  turned,  and  that  the  king  reached  the  banks  of  tlie 
Kina  at  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening,  that  is,  seven  hours  from  the  turn- 
ing (measured)  by  the  sun.  If  the  kiiig  waited  at  the  opening  of  the  val- 
ley for  the  arrival  of  the  rearguard  and  then  at  once  moved  forward  to 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  41 

the  night's  camping- place,  it  would  seem  that  it  took  the  rearguard 
seven  hours  to  cross  the  Ridge,  about  the  time  that  we  would  expect  to 
be  consumed  in  the  passage  by  troops  encumbered  with  camp  furniture 
and  all  the  motley  array  that  accompanies  an  army  on  the  march.  If, 
therefore,  it  took  the  rearguard  seven  hours  to  march  from  'Aruna  to 
Megiddo,  we  must  suppose  that  the  van  had  consumed  much  the  same 
time  in  covering  the  same  distance.  As  the  king  was  at  the  mouth  of 
the  valley  at  least  by  noon,  for  the  rearguard  which  left  'Aruna  at  noon 
did  not  leave  till  after  the  van  had  crossed  the  Ridge,  he  must  have 
started  from  'Aruna  at  least  by  five  o'clock  in  the  morning,  the  whole 
day  being  thus  consumed  in  the  passage.  In  Palestine  in  the  month  of 
May  it  would  still  be  bright  daylight  at  seven  in  the  evening  and  the 
army  would  therefore  have  reached  its  camping-place  well  before 
dark.76 

The  spot  chosen  for  the  Egyptian  camp  was  most  certainly  the  ex- 
panse of  level  ground  extending  along  the  south  bank  of  the  Kina 
(see  View  VII).  A  more  suitable  location  could  not  have  been  chosen.  Here 
was  an  ample  stretch  of  flat  land  just  a,t  the  opening  of  the  pass  (see 
Map  III).  By  camping  here  the  army  secured  its  line  of  commiinication 
with  the  south  by  which  it  had  just  come  from  the  other  side  of  the 
Ridge.  Besides,  the  wady  of  the  Kina  served  as  a  defence  on  the  two  sides 
most  exposed  to  attack  from  the  direction  of  Megiddo.  The  stream  furnish- 
ed abundant  water  for  both  men  and  animals.  Moreover,  if  the  Egypt- 
ians posted  a  force  on  the  knoll  F,  they  would  be  able  to  prevent  attacks 
from  the  east  during  the  night.  It  is  obvious  that  the  army  did  not 
move  out  into  the  open  Plain  of  Esdra^lon,  for  to  do  so  they  would  have 
been  obliged  to  pass  through  the  forces  of  the  enemy  who  held  the  road 
to  Taanach  and,  had  they  succeeded  in  doing  so,  they  would  have  been 
cut  off  from  their  line  of  communication  over  the  Ridge.     Furthermore, 

76.  All  the  current  histories  have  interpreted  this  passage  to  mean  that  the  army  completed 
the  crossing  of  the  mountains  by  about  one  in  the  at'ternoon.  taking  "seven  hours  from  the 
turning"  to  mean  seven  hours  from  sunrise.  This  interprrtation,  aside  from  the  fact  that  the 
"turning"  seems  to  have  little  meaning  when  applied  to  sunrise,  would  be  difficult  of  acceptance, 
owing  to  the  facts  of  the  physical  situation.  That  an  army  of  10,000  to  15,000  men,  with  all 
the  camp  furniture  of  an  army  on  a  campaign  far  away  from  home,  and  a  large  part  of  whose 
force  consisted  of  chariots,  could  traverse  a  narrow  mountain  defile  eight  to  nine  miles  long  be- 
tween sunrise  and  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoDn  is  almost  inconceivable.  An  army,  strung  out  in 
almost  single  file,  from  the  time  the  van  left  'Aruna  till  the  rear  reached  the  mouth  of  the 
valley  by  Megiddo,  would  certainly  have  consumed  the  best  part  of  a  day. 


42  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 

the  Annals  would  seem  to  indicate  that  the  bank  of  the  Kina  south  of 
Megiddo,  at  which  place  the  army  arrived  at  seven  in  the  evening,  was 
the  spot  where  the  camp  was  pitched.  Any  location  on  the  bank  of 
the  brook  out  in  the  open  plain  would  not  have  been  south,  but  eat<t 
or  north,  of  Megiddo,  and  throughout  the  Annals  the  writer  is  quite 
accurate  in  the  indication  of  direction.  Also  the  location  of  the  camp 
at  this  spot  falls  in  well  with  the  operations  in  the  next  day's  battle 

Our  knowledge  of  the  appearance  of  an  Egyptian  camp  is  largely 
drawn  from  the  battle  reliefs  of  Ramses  II. ^'^  These  have  been  so  fre- 
quently and  so  fully  described  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  enter  into  a 
discussion  of  the  subject  here,  especially  as  it  does  not  bear  directly  on 
the  problem  before  us.  Suffice  it  to  say  that,  if  we  may  trust  the  reliefs, 
Ramses'  camp  was  bounded  by  the  shield?  of  the  troops  set  up  on  end  so 
as  to  inclose  a  large  rectangular  piece  of  ground.  In  the  center  of  this 
inclosure  stood  the  royal  tent,  around  which  were  camped  the  troops  and 
camp-followers.  Such  in  general  we  may  suppose  to  have  been  the  ar- 
rangement of  Thutmose's  bivouack  by  the  Kina.  The  Annalist  gives  us  a 
glimpse  into  the  routine  activities  of  the  camp  that  shows  us  how  order- 
ly war  had  already  become  even  in  this  remote  age.  First  of  all  orders 
were  issued  to  the  troops  to  prepare  themselves  and  their  weapons  for 
the  morrow's  conflict,  and  we  may  picture  to  ourselves  the  busy  scenes 
as  bowstrings  were  tested,  arrows,  speai's  and  knives  sharpened,  chari- 
ot wheels  examined,  and  all  the  military  accoutrement  put  in  order.  The 
king  withdrew  to  his  tent,  doubtless  to  consult  with  his  officers  and  de- 
cide upon  the  plan  of  action  to  be  followed  in  the  morning  as  based  on 
the  topography  of  the  immediate  environs  of  Megiddo.  Some  such  con- 
sultation must  have  taken  place,  for  it  is  evident  that  the  next  day's 
conflict  was  no  haphazzard  engagement  but  a  well-ordered  and  well- 
generaled  battle  with  all  the  physical  features  of  the  region  taken  into 
consideration.  The  phrase  which  I  have  translated,  "The  officers  were 
provided  for"  may  possibly  refer  to  the  issuance  of  these  orders  to  the 
various  officers  of  the  army.  The  words  "ivh'  n  sm,si() '  'are  quite  obscure, 
but  would  seem  to  refer  to  the  distribution  of  rations  to  the  troops  or 
court.  Then  follows  the  statement  that  the  watch  made  its  rounds  and 
that  the  royal  guard,   "the  watch  in  life",  was   stationed  at  the  royal 

77.    Lepsius,  Denkma'er,  III,   154,   155.      Breasted,    B<itt!c  of  KaJesh,.  Plate  I. 


TflE  Battle  of  Megiddo  43 

tent.  Then,  when  all  these  preparations  had  been  carried  out,  report 
was  made  at  headquarters,  to  put  it  in  modern  terms,  that  "all's  well". 
The  army  had  settled  down  to  rest  before  the  arduous  duties  of  the 
next  day. 

Of  what  was  going  on  across  the  Kina  among  the  Asiatics  the  Annal- 
ist has  told  us  nothing.  We  can  only  surmise  the  movements  of  the 
enemy.  That  they  were  taken  by  surprise  is  evident  from  what  has 
gone  before.  They  had  apparently  made  their  preparations  for  meet- 
ing Thutmose  in  the  direction  of  Taanach,''^  and  when  they  discovered 
that  he  had  taken  them  in  the  rear,  their  consternation  must  have  been 
great.  As,  however,  Thutmose  did  not  advance  from  the  mouth  of  the 
pass  for  some  five  hours  or  more  after  the  Egyptian  vanguard  had 
accomplished  the  crossing,  the  Asiatics  would  have  had  abundant  time 
to  recall  their  main  body  from  the  direction  of  Taanach,  only  about  four 
or  five  miles  away,  and  to  prepare  to  meet  the  Egyptian  advance  on  the 
following  day. 

The  Asiatics  would  undoubtedly  have  pitched  their  camp  so  as  to 
place  it  between  the  Egyptians  and  the  city  (see  Map  III).  No  more 
favorable  location  for  a  camp  could  have  been  found  than  the  almost 
level  top  of  the  mound  G  just  south  of  Megiddo  (see  View  VI).  It  is 
an  elevated  p'ece  of  ground  that  could  therefore  be  more  easily  defended 
than  a  lower  situation,  while  by  choosing  this  spot  the  Asiatics  could 
protect  the  city  on  its  weakest  side  where  the  wall  was  lowest  and 
most  accessible.  We  must  also  suppose  the  camp  to  have  been  located 
at  about  this  spot,  rather  than  on  the  lower  land  to  the  west,  north  or 
east  of  the  city,  for  on  the  next  day  when  the  center  and  right  of  the 
Egyptians  closed  in  from  the  west  and  south  of  the  city,  they  seem  to 
have  charged  directly  through  the  camp  of  the  Allies.  To  have  made  this 
possible  the  camp  must  have  been  located  at  about  the  spot  indicated 
above.  As  to  what  went  on  in  the  Asiatic  quarters  that  night,  the  An- 
nalist has  given  us  no  information  and  it  is  useless  to  speculate  on  such 
a  subject. 

78.  At  any  rate  it  seems  evident  that,  of  the  three  roads  across  the  Ridge,  the  Zefti  road 
did  not  enter  seriously  into  the  calculations  of  the  Asiatics,  for  they  apparently  so  disposed  their 
forces  as  to  enable  them  to  concentrate  rhe'r  troops  near  the  mouth  either  of  the  'Anina  road 
or  of  the  road  bv  Taanach.  Had  tliey  anticipated  an  attack  from  the  Zetti  road,  they  would 
most  probably  have  advanced  a  portion  of  their  force  along  ttie  road  north  ot  Megiddo,  a  move- 
ment which  does  not  seem  to  have  been  undertaken  at  all. 


44  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 


IV 


THE   BATTLE   OF  MEGIDDO 
THE  ANNALS,  LINES   84-90 

Urk.  657  Year  23,  first  month  of  the  third  season,  day  21;  day  of  the 
feast  of  the  new  moon  as  usual.  The  king  appeared  early  in 
the  morning.  Then  orders  were  issued  to  the  entire  army  to 
cross  [the  valley  of  the  Kina.]'?^  (85)  His  Majesty  proceeded  in  a 
chariot  of  electrum,  clad  in  his  accoutrements  of  war,  like  Horus 
the  Valiant,  Lord  of  Offerings,  like  Montu  of  Thebes.  His  father 
Amon  was  strengthening  his   limbs.    The   south   wing   of  the 

army  of  his  Majesty  was  at  a  hill  south  of Kina, 

and  the  north  wing  was  at  the  north-west  of  Megiddo,  his  Ma- 
jesty  occupying   the  center.   Amon  was  the  protection  of  his 
members.    The  power  of  the  might  of  [Set  was   the  strength] 
(86)  of  his  limbs. 
Then  his  Majesty  prevailed  against  them   at  the  head  of  his 

Urk.  658  troops;  (and  when)  they  saw  that  his  Majesty  prevailed  against 
them,  they  fled  headlong  [to]  Megiddo  with  faces  of  fear.  They 
abandoned  their  horses  and  their  chariots  of  gold  and  of  silver. 
They  drew  them  [up]  by  hoisting  with  their  garments  into 
this  city.  Now  the  people  had  shut  up  this  city  against  them 
[and  they  let  down]  (87)  garments  to  hoist  them  upward  into 
this  city. 

Now  had  the  troops  of  his  Majesty  only  not  given  their 
hearts  to  plunder  the  possessions  of  the  enemy,  they  would 
[have  plundered]  Megiddo  at  this  moment,  while  the  wretched 
enemy  of  Kadesh   and  the   wretched  enemy  of  this  city   were 

79.  The  restoration  "valley  of  the  Kina"  (  \n-t  k\-->!^)  would  seem  just  to  fill  the  lacuna 
as  given  in  the  Urkunden,  and  would  also  agree  with  the  actual  situation  as  developed  in  the 
discussion  above. 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  45 

drawn  (up)  to  secure  their  entrance  into  their  city,  the  fear  of 
his  Majesty  having  entered  (88)  [into  their  hmbs.]  Their  arms 
were  weak.  His  serpent  diadem  had  prevailed  against  them. 

Urk.  659  Then  were  captured  their  horses  and  chariots  of  gold  and 
silver,  made  an  easy  [spoil.]  Their  battle-array  was  lying 
stretched  out  like  fishes  in  a  [corner.]80  The  victorious  troops 
of  his  Majesty  went  around  counting  their  respective  portions. 
Then  was  captured  the  tent  of  [that]  wretched  [enemy,]  which 

was  worked^'  [with  (89)  silver] The  entire  army 

was  rejoicing  and  giving  praise  to  Anion  [for  the  victory] 
which  he  had  given  to  his  son  on  [this  day.  They  gave  praise] 
to  his  Majesty,  exalting  his  victory,  They  brought  up  the  spoil 
they    had  taken,  consisting  of  hands,  of  living   prisoners,   of 

Urk.  660  horses  and  chariots  of  gold  and  silver  and  of  painted  stuff. 

(90) His  Majesty  commanded  his  army,  saying, 

"Capture  ye victory.      Behold,   [every   land]   is 

given  [to  my  Majesty  according  to  the  command]  of  Re  this 
day;  for  every  chief  of  every  [north]ern  country  which  has  re- 
volted is  within  it;  for  it  is  the  capture  of  a  thousand  cities,  the 
capture  of  Megiddo.   Capture  ye,  capture  ye,  thoroughly!" 

At  this  point  it  is  necessary  to  determine  from  just  what  direction 
the  attack  upon  the  Asiatic  lines  was  delivered  on  the  following  day. 
Our  data  for  reaching  a  conclusion  on  this  subject  are  woefully  meagre 
and  leave  us  at  the  last  not  quite  satisfied.  Only  two  statements  are 
made  in  the  Annals  in  regard  to  the  location  of  the  Egyptian  lines. 
First,  "Then  orders  were  issued  to  the  entire  army  to  cross  [the  valley 
of  the  Kina]",  and,  second,  "The  south  wing  of  the  army  of  his   Majesty 

was  at  a  hill  south  of Kina  and  the  north  wing  was  at  the 

northwest   of  Megiddo,   his   Majesty  occupying  the  center."    One  other 
fact  may  be  added  to  this  scanty  information,  namely,  that  the   Asiatic 

80.  Or  as  Settle  divides  the  text,  "like  fishes  in  a  round  corner".  I  have  followed  Breas- 
ted's  arrangement  (Ancient  Records,  II,  431)  and  have  construed  sny  with  what  follows  rather 
than  with  what  goes  before.      In  any  case  the  passage  is  obscure. 

81.  Generally  heretofore  the  hieroglyphic  figure  of  a  bird  at  this  place  has  been  read  as  a 
s'-sign,  on  which  reading  was  based  the  statement  thit  the  captured  tent  contained  the  son  of  the 
king  of  Kadesh,  who  thus  fell  into  Thutmose's  hands.  Sethe,  however,  reads  on  the  stone  a 
^'-sign  and  so  restored  byk.,  "worked,  wrought,"  which  reading  I  have  here  followed. 


46  The  Battle  of  Megtddo 

camp  most  certainly  lay  between  the  Egyptian  army  and  the  city,  for, 
as  has  been  already  pointed  out,  the  Egyptians,  in  pursuing  the  Asiatics 
fleeing  into  the  city  after  the  battle,  came  upon  the  latter's  camp  and 
stopped  to  plunder  it.  The  camp,  therefore,  very  likely  lay  almost  op- 
posite the  Egyptian  center,  so  that  the  troops  converging  oti  the  city  all 
fell  to  plundering  the  possessions  of  the  enemy.  Had  the  camp  lain  to 
one  side,  it  is  likely  that  at  least  a  part  of  the  army  would  have  contin- 
ued the  pursuit  of  the  fleeing  foe  up  to  the  city  walls.  On  these  few 
facts  and  this  one  deduction  must  rest  the  decision  as  to  the  direction 
from  which  the  Egyptian  attack  was  made. 

"The  northwest  of  Megiddo"  and  ''the  hill  south  of Kina" 

mark  the  two  extremities  of  the  Egyptian  lines.  "The  former  must  re- 
fer to  the  strip  of  cultivated  land  between  the  Tell  and  the  hill  A  (see 
Map  II),  that  is,  at  or  near  the  northern  end  of  this  strip  of  land  where 
it  opens  into  the  plain  of  Esdrselon  (see  View   IX).     The   "hill  south  of 

Kina"  is  undoubtedly  the  knoll  F.  Being  a  detached  eminence 

it  would  easily  serve  as  a  defensible  termination  to  a  line  of  battle.  By 
occupying  this  rise  the  Pharaoh  could  protect  the  southern  wing  of  his 
army  and  until  it  moved  forward  away  from  the  knoll,  could  prevent 
the  enemy  from  turning  his  right  flank.  Either  C  or  D,  the  other  two 
hills  which  might  be  considered  south  of  the  Kina,  are  so  much  in  line 
with  the  hills  on  either  side  of  them  that  they  would  hardly  serve 
as  a  natural  defence  upon  which  to  rest  one  wing  of  the  army.  Nor  do 
they  stand  out  prominently  enough  to  serve  as  a  distinctive  designation 
of  location.  Moreover,  as  the  steepness  of  the  bank  of  the  Kina  where 
it  skirts  the  south  side  of  the  mound  H,  is  too  great  to  allow  of  troops 
making  an  effective  attack  on  H  from  that  direction,  the  right  or  south 
wing  of  the  Egyptian  force  must  have  been  compelled  to  move  round 
mound  H  to  the  east  to  attack  the  Asiatic  south  wing.  If,  therefore,  the 
southern  extremity  of  the  Egyptian  line  rested  on  knoll  F  i)efore 
the  battle,  the  Pharaoh's  troops  would  have  been  in  a  position  to 
advance  directly  against  the  enemy  defending  the  east  side  of  the  group 
of  mounds  (see  Map  IV). 

If,  therefore,  we  take  the  knoll  F    as  the   "Hill  south    of Kina", 

we  must  then  decide  whether  the  Egyptian  line  of  battle  faced  the  city 
from  the  west  and  soutli  of  Megiddo  or  from  the  open  plain  to  the  north 


The  Battle  of  Megtddo  47 

and  east,  In  either  case  it  would  be  possible  to  station  the  troops  so  that 
one  wing  would  be  to  the  northwest  of  the  city  and  the  other  wing 
would  rest  on  the  knoll  F.  Had  the  Annalist  but  seem  fit  to  designate 
the  wings  of  the  army  as  right  and  left,  we  would  then  be  able  to  locate 
the  Pharaoh's  line  of  battle  exactly,  but  as  he  speaks  of  them  merely  as 
the  north  wing  and  the  south  wing,  we  are  left  to  solve  our  problem  in 
accordances,  with  what  seems  to  agree  best  with  all  the  known  circum- 
stances, especially  with  the  topography. 

The  statement  that  "orders  were  issued  to  the  entire  army  to  cross 
[the  Valley  of  the  Kina"]  does  not  throw  any  light  oii  this  aspect  of  the 
problem.  Whether  the  army  was  drawn  up  to  the  west  and  south  or  to 
the  north  and  east  of  the  city,  it  would  have  been  necessary  for  the 
bulk  of  the  troops  to  cross  the  Kina  before  taking  up  their  position.  We 
can  therefore  eliminate  this  datum  from  the  determining  factors  of  the 
situation. 

That  the  Egyptian  line  of  battle  was  drawn  up  on  the  north  and  east 
of  the  city  seems  highly  improbable  for  the  following  reasons.  First,  as 
we  have  seen,  the  Pharaoh's  camp  on  the  night  before  the  battle  must 
have  lain  in  the  open  stretch  of  land  between  the  Kina  and  the  mouth 
of  the  valley  through  which  the  'Aruna  roadran.  To  have  advanced  into 
the  open  plain  would  have  cut  him  off  from  his  line  of  communication 
with  the  south  and,  in  case  of  defeat,  would  have  exposed  his  army  to 
almost  certian  destruction  as  it  would  have  cut  off  the  way  of  retreat. 
Second,  in  advancing  into  the  plain  Thutmose  would  have  ex]iosed  his 
force  to  a  flank  attack  from  the  direction  of  Megiddo,  much  more  than 
would  have  been  the  case  had  he  moved  out  to  the  west  and  south  of 
the  city.  Third,  as  the  Asiatic  camp  lay  between  the  Pharaoh  's  battle- 
line  and  Megiddo,  we  must  suppose  that  the  camp  was  situated  to  the 
northeast  of  the  city  and  therefore  that  the  Asiatics  had  failed  to  place 
themselves  between  the  city  and  the  Egyptians  on  the  previous  night. 
Fourth,  if  the  Allies'  camp  was  so  situated  to  the  northeast  of  the  city, 
then  it  would  have  been  necessary  for  the  Egyptians  to  make  a  wide 
detour  in  the  Plain  in  order  to  take  up  their  station  previous  to  the 
battle,  and  in  so  doing  they  would  have  exposed  themselves,  when  at  a 
great  disadvantage,  to  the  attack  of  the  enemy.  Fifth,  if  the  Asiatic 
camp   lay  to   the   northeast   of  Megiddo,   the  Asiatic  army  would,  of 


48  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 

course,  have  been  drawn  up  to  the  north  and  east  of  their  camp.  The 
Egyptian  army,  therefore,  in  taking  up  their  position  to  the  north  and 
east  of  the  Alhes,  but  with  the  wings  of  their  army  resting  on  the  hill 
A  and  the  knoll  F,  would  have  been  strung  out  in  a  most  remarkable  for- 
mation. At  best  their  line  would  have  been  very  thin  and  would  have 
formed  roughly  at  least  270'  of  a  huge  circle  with  the  Asiatic  camp  and 
army  well  in  the  center  of  the  circle.  That  the  Pharaoh  would  have  at- 
tempted to  assume  any  such  extraordinary  formation  is  as  difficult  to 
conceive  as  it  is  difficult  to  suppose  that  the  Asiatics  would  have  stood 
quietly  by  and  either  have  allowed  themselves  to  be  so  surrounded  or 
not  have  taken  advantage  of  the  opportunity  afforded  by  the  enemy's 
extended  and  weakened  line  to  cut  it  in  two  in  the  center  and  roll  the 
shattered  portions  back  upon  the  wings.  Taking  all  these  circumstances 
into  consideration,  it  seems  certain  that  we  can  dismiss  any  idea  of  the 
king's  having  drawn  up  his  lines  to  the  north  and  east  of  the  city. 

Turning  to  the  alternative  position,  that  to  the  west  and  south  of 
Megiddo,  we  find  the  following  considerations  in  favor  of  Thutmose's 
having  chosen  that  side  of  the  city  for  his  attack.  First,  he  would  be 
able  thereby  to  secure  his  line  of  retreat  back  over  the  'Aruna  road  to 
the  south.  Second,  he  would  not  have  to  expose  the  bulk  of  his  army  to 
a  flank  attack  while  taking  up  his  position.  Third,  such  a  location  would 
allow  of  our  placing  the  Asiatic  camp  on  the  mound  G,  between  the 
city  and  the  Egyptian  encampment,  the  place  where  we  would  naturally 
expect  it  to  be  located.  Fourth,  the  Egyptian  lines  would  not  have  been 
drawn  out  so  far  but  that  they  could  have  been  compact  enough  to  have 
made  them  an  effective  attacking  force.  Their  length  would  have  been 
only  about  half  that  necessary  had  they  taken  u])  the  other  i)osition  to 
the  north  and  east  of  Megiddo.  Considering  the  whole  situation,  it 
would  appear  certain  that  Thutmose's  army  was  drawn  up  to  the  west 
and  south  of  the  city  in  the  semicircle  of  cultivated  land  between  the 
hills  A,  B,  C,  D,  and  E  and  the  mounds  G,  H,  and  I. 

On  the  morning  of  the  battle,  the  twenty -first  day  of  the  first  month 
of  the  third  season  (May  15,  1479),  the  signal  for  the  commencement  of 
hostilities  seems  to  have  been  the  appearance  of  the  king  from  the  royal 
tent.  At  once  the  order  was  issued,  as  the  Annals  has  it,  "to  the  entire 
army  to  cross  [the  valley  of  the  Kina]"    As  the  Egyptian  camp   most 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  49 

certainly  stood  on  the  south  of  the  Kina  on  the  flat  land  between  the 
brook  and  the  hills  D  and  E,  the  words  lost  in  the  lacuna  must  have 
referred  to  the  depression  through  which  the  brook  flowed.  There  is  no 
other  feature  of  the  topography  of  which  the  word  "cross"  could  well  be 
used.  It  seems  safe,  therefore,  to  proceed  on  the  assumption  that  the 
royal  command  was  to  cross  the  Kina.  That  the  words  "entire  army" 
are  to  be  taken  literally  is  impossible,  if  we  are  to  accept  the  statement 
that    the    south   wing    of  the   Egyptian  force  was  later  at  the  "hill 

south  of Kina".   The  lacuna  in  this  instance  must  also  have  included 

some  phrase  applicable  to  the  valley  of  the  Kina.  If  the  entire  army  had 
crossed  the  brook,  the  south  wing  could  not  well  be  said  to  be  at  the 
hill  south  of  the  brook,  for  the  channel  that  the  stream  has  cut  is  so 
marked  a  feature  of  the  topography  that  we  may  be  sure  it,  rather  than 
the  hill  sorfth  of  it,  would  have  been  mentioned  had  the  brook  intervened 
between  the  Egyptian  south  wing  and  the  hill.  When  the  Annalist 
speaks  of  the  "entire  army",  he  probably  uses  it  in  a  loose  sense  to  des- 
ignate the  large  majority  of  the  troops,  including,  as  we  shall  see,  the 
center  and  the  north  wing.  Only  on  this  interpretation  of  the  words  "the 
entire  army"  is  is  possible  to  reconcile  these  conflicting  statements. ^2 

82.  In  the  current  liistories  the  most  detailed  accounts  ot  the  position  of  the  Egyptian  troops 
are  given  by  Maspero,  Budge,  Breasted  and  Hall  as  follows:  Maspero,  Stnigg/e  of  the  Nations, 
p.  258,  "By  dawn  the  next  day  the  whole  army  was  in  motion.  It  was  formed  into  a  single 
line,  the  right  wing  protected  by  the  torrent,  the  left  extended  into  the  plain,  stretching  bevond 
Megiddo  towards  the  north-west."  Budge,  Hist,  of  Egypt,  IV,  p.  33-34,  "At  d.iybreak  on 
the  21st  the  whole  army  marched  out  in  single  formation,  its  right  wing  resting  on  the  river  and 
its  left  reaching  to  Megiddo  on  its  north-western  side."  Brensted,  Hiit.  of  Egypt,  p. 289,  "Late 
in  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day  (the  fourteenth)  or  during  the  ensuing  night,  Thutmose  took 
advantage  of  the  enemy's  position  on  the  east  and  south-east  of  his  own  force  to  draw  his  own 
line  around  the  west  side  of  Megiddo  and  boldly  thr'^w  out  his  left  wing  on  the  northwest  of  the 
city.  He  thus  secured,  in  case  of  necessity,  a  safe  and  easy  line  of  retreat  westward  along  the 
Zefti  road,  while  at  the  same  time  his  extreme  left  might  cut  off  the  enemy  from  flight  north- 
ward." Hall,  Anc.  Hist,  of  the  Near  East,  p.  238,  "The  Egyptians  who  advanced  in  line, 
pivoting  on  their  right  wing,  which  remained  upon  the  spur  of  hill  above  el-Lejja  and  south  of 
the  brook  Kina,  until  the  left  wing  had  swung  around  to  the  north-east  of  Megiddo  itself."  All 
these  interpretations  agree  in  general  and  also,  to  a  large  extejit,  fit  in  with  the  local  topography. 
In  some  points,  however,  they  are  open  to  criticism.  Both  Maspero  and  Budge  state  that  the 
right    wing    rested    on    the    River    Kina,    Vvhereas    ths     Annalist  "States    that     it    rested     on    "a 

hill    south   of. Kina",     which    certaitily  cannot    be    interpreted    to    mean    the    river 

itself.  Also  the  Annals  give  no  support  to  Budge's  phrase,  "in  single  formation."  Breasted  sug- 
gests that  the  Egyptians  took  up  their  position  "late  on  the  same  day  (the  day  of  crossing 
the  mountains)  or  during  the  ensuing  night."  However,  he  interpreted  differently  the  phrase 
which  I  have  translated  "the  king  appearei'  early  in  the  morning,"  The  latter  translation  would 
preclude  the  idea  of  the  Egyptians  iiaving  taken  up  their  position  before  the  morning  of  the  battle. 
Hall's  statement  that  the  Egyptian  army  piloted  on  their  right  wing,  which  remained  on  a  squr 
ot  hill  above  el-Lejja  [sic)  is  difficult  to  understand  in  the  face  of  the  configuration  of  the  coun- 
try, tor     It   would    seem  to     necessitate  the  crossing  of  the  low  limestone  hills  around  Megiddo  bv 


50  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 

In  order  to  reach  the  north  bank  of  the  Kina,  the  Egyptian  force 
would  have  to  cross  the  stream  at  or  near  the  point  "a"  at  the 
opening  of  the  Wady  es-Sitt.  This  would  have  been  necessitated  by  the 
depth  of  the  channel  that  the  stream  has  cut  across  the  flat  cultivated 
land.  As  has  already  been  pointed  out,  this  channel  is  some  fifteen  or 
twenty  feet  deep  at  "b",  while  at  "a"  it  is  only  two  or  three  feet  deep. 
As  there  was  a  body  of  Egyptian  chariotvy  with  the  center  of  the  army, 
it  would  be  necessary  for  them  to  find  some  point  at  which  the  crossing 
could  be  easily  made,  and  such  a  point  is  found  anywhere  along  the 
course  of  the  stream  south  of  "a".  That  all  the  chariots  in  the  Egyptian 
ranks  were  with  that  portion  of  the  army  north  of  the  Kina  is  certain, 
for  the  banks  of  the  stream  between  "b"  and  the  place  where  the  brook 
crosses  the  Taanach  road  at  "c"  are  so  steep,  in  places  being  practically 
perpendicular,  as  to  preclude  all  idea  of  chariots  crossing  the  stream  be- 
tween those  points,  especially  in  the  face  of  an  enemy,  as  would  have 
been  necessary  had  the  chariots  advanced  towards  the  city  from  the 
south  of  the  Kina. 

As  the  Egyptians  were  the  attacking  force,  their  formation  and  posi- 
tion would  necessarily  be  determined  to  a  great  extent  by  the  location 
and  disposition  of  the  Asiatic  army.  It  will  therefore  be  necessary  to 
consider  the  position  of  the  Allies  before  proceeding  further  with  the 
discussion  of  the  Egyptian  lines  of  battle.  With  their  camp  pitched  on 
mound  G  there  would  be  but  one  formation  natural  for  the  Allies  to 
assume.  It  is  hardly  conceivable  that  they  would  have  foregone  the  ad- 
vantage to  be  derived  from  the  elevated  position  of  the  mounds.  We 
must  suppose  that  their  lines  were  drawn  up  around  the  edge  of  mounds 
G,  H  and  I.  By  this  formation  they  would  have  had  the  natural  defence 
against  the  onslaught  of  the  Egyptians  that  the  sloping  sides  of  the 
mounds  afforded  and,  in  the  case  of  the  south  wing,  the  channel  of  tbe 
Kina  also  (see  Map  IV).  That  there  was  a  strong  body  of  chariots  with 
the  Allies  is  certain,  not  only  from  the  fact  that  the  chariot  as  an  instru- 
ment of  warfare  was  in  use  in  Asia  before  it  was  known  in  Egypt, 
but  also  from  the  fact  that  among  the  spoil  taken  from  Megiddo  after  the 

the  ch.Triots  in  the  center  of  the  Egyptian  lines,  .111  impossible  feat.  All  there  accounts,  however, 
agree  that  the  attack  on  Megiddo  was  delivered  from  the  south  and  west  of  th  •  city  and  not 
from  the  side  of  the  plain,  though  in  one  or  two  instances  the  accompanying  mai's  do  not  b,o 
place  the  battle-field. 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  51 

battle  were  924  chariots  and  2,238  horses  of  all  kinds.  We  need  not  sup- 
pose that  all  of  them  were  present  in  the  battle.  Undoubtedly  many  of 
them  were  taken  during  the  course  of  the  later  siege  and  some  may  have 
come  from  surrounding  towns,  the  spoil  from  which  has  apparently  been 
included  in  that  from  Megiddo  in  the  lists  of  booty.  This  is  by  far  the 
largest  number  of  chariots  recorded  as  having  been  taken  in  any  battle 
during  Thutmose's  campaigns.  The  only  other  three  instances  in  which 
the  numbers  have  survived  give  us  13  chariots  from  I-n-r-t^^  on  the  sev- 
enth campaign,  15  from  the  district  of  Nuges^"*  on  the  ninth  campaign, 
and  60  from  I-r-y-n  and  Naharin^^  on  the  tenth  campaign.  But  as  in  other 
respects  the  numbers  in  the  lists  of  booty  from  Megiddo  are  far  in  ex- 
cess of  those  recording  the  spoil  from  the  later  campaigns,  we  must  sup- 
pose that  the  forces  put  into  the  field  by  the  Allies  at  Megiddo  were  larg- 
er than  the  Egyptians  encountered  in  any  of  the  subsequent  campaigns 
where  they  were  dealing  with  more  or  less  isolated  states  instead  of 
with  a  wide  spread  and  powerful  coalition. 

As  has  already  been  said,  it  is  not  probable  that  all  the  chariots  and 
horses  which  figure  in  the  lists  of  booty  from  Megiddo  were  actually 
present  in  this  battle.  There  must  have  been  a  sufficient  number  present, 
however,  to  have  constituted  a  considerable  portion  of  the  Asiatic 
strength.  It  is  necessary,  therefore,  in  determining  the  position  of  the 
allied  troops  to  take  this  body  of  chariots  into  consideration.  If  we  are 
right  in  placing  the  Egyptian  lines  in  a  semicircle  along  the  strip  of 
cultivated  land  between  the  foothills  and  the  mounds  on  which  the  Asia- 
tics were  camped,  that  consideration  alone  would  lead  us  to  conclude 
that  the  enemy  was  drawn  up  in  roughly  similar  formation  opposite 
them.  When  we  examine  the  topography  of  the  battle-field,  we  see  at 
once  that  such  a  formation  is  exactly  that  which  an  army  occupying 
the  mounds  G  and  H,  and  possibly  I,  would  be  likely  to  assume.  By 
arranging  their  lines  along  the  top  of  the  slopes  on  the  west  and  south 
of  the  mounds  G,  H  and  I,  the  Asiatics  would  be  able  to  secure  what 
advantage  was  to  be  derived  from  forcing  their  opponents  to  attack 
them  while  charging  up  hill.  Moreover,  should  they   themselves  charge 

83.  Urk.    IV,    691. 

84.  Uri.    IV,    704. 

85.  Urk.    IV,    711. 


52  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 

forward  against  the  Egyptians,  they  would  have  the  advantage  of  ad- 
vancing down  hill,  as  did  the  Greeks  at  Marathon.  If  we  consider  it  like- 
ly that  the  Allies  would  thus  accommodate  themselves  to  the  topog- 
raphy of  the  country,  there  can  then  be  only  one  location  where  they 
could  conceivably  have  placed  their  chariotry.  The  northern  part  of  the 
western  slope  of  mound  G  is  too  steep  to  allow  chariots  to  descend  with 
any  assurance  that  they  would  arrive  at  the  bottom  of  the  incline  in  an 
upright  position.  The  same  is  true  of  the  south  and  east  side  of  mound 
H.  However,  between  the  northwest  side  of  mound  G  and  the  south 
side  of  mound  H  the  descent  from  the  mounds  to  the  cultivated  land 
below  is  quite  gradual,  allowing  a  space  about  half  a  mile  long  down 
which  chariots  could  advance  with  ease  (see  View  XIII).  It  is  at  this 
point  in  the  Asiatic  lines,  therefore,  that  we  must  locate  their  chariotry. 
It  is  there  also,  in  the  center  of  their  force,  that  we  would  naturally  ex- 
pect them  to  mass  their  greatest  strength,  opposite  the  portion  of  the 
Egyptian  army  that  Thutmose  himself  led  in  person. 

With  the  Allies  thus  disposed,  the  location  of  the  Egyptians  becomes 
fairly  certain.  The  north  wing,  which  was  to  the  northwest  of  Megiddo, 
was  drawn  up  along  the  foot  of  the  hill  A  with  a  portion  of  the  Asiatic 
foot  opposite  it  on  the  side  of  the  mound  G.  The  Egyptian  center,  prob- 
ably composed  largely  of  chariots,  took  up  its  position  along  the  foot  of 
the  hills  B  and  C  opposite  the  Asiatic  center,  which  was  on  the  western 
edge  of  the  mound  H.  Then  the  Egyptian  south  wing,  where  only  foot- 
soldiers  were  practicable,  probably  held  the  ground  occupied  on  the  pre- 
ceding evening  by  Thutmose's  camp,  the  southern  extremity  of  the 
wing  resting  on  the  knoll  F. 

When  once  the  battle  was  joined,  the  chariots  would  charge  at 
full  speed  upon  the  opposing  ranks.  At  the  word  of  command,  therefore, 
we  may  suppose  that  the  Egyptians  advanced  upon  the  mounds  G,  H 
and  I  from  the  west  and  south.  Direct  advance  upon  the  south  of  mound 
H  would  be  very  difficult,  as  the  banks  of  the  Kina  and  the  slope  of  the 
mound  is  steep  at  that  point.  We  may  therefore  suppose  that  the  Asia- 
tics left  only  a  small  force  to  hold  this  jwsition  and  placed  their 
south  wing  on  mound  I,  one  extermity  of  the  line  be'ng  protecte;!  by  tlie 
steep  side  of  mound  H  and  the  other  by  the  channel  of  the  Kina.  If  the 
south  wing  of  the  Egyptians  was  compose!  of  infantry,  it  would  be  pos- 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  53 

sible  for  them  to  cross  the  Kina  to  the  attack  of  the  Asiatic  south  wing. 
When  once  this  wing  had  been  broken,  the  Egyptians  could  then  attack 
the  Asiatic  main  body  in  the  rear  with  teUing  effect.  It  is  possible  that 
some  such  movement,  rapidly  executed,  won  the  day  for  the  Pharaoh. 

Of  the  actual  conflict  which  took  place  there  is  not  a  vestige  of  infor- 
mation. To  judge  from  the  Annalist's  narrative  it  would  seem  that  the 
Asiatics  fled  without  striking  a  blow.  "Then  his  Majesty  prevailed  against 
them  at  the  head  of  his  troops;  and  when  they  saw  that  his  Majesty 
prevailed  against  them,  they  fled  headlong  to  Megiddo  with  faces  of  fear. 
They  abandoned  their  horses  and  their  chariots  of  gold  and  of  silver.  They 
drew  them  up  by  hoisting  with  their  garments  into  this  city,  for  the 
people  had  shut  up  the  city  against  them,  and  they  let  down  garments 
to  hoist  them  upwards  into  the  city."  That  the  Allies  held  their  ground 
for  any  great  length  of  time  seems  unlikely,  if  we  are  to  trust  the  state- 
ment of  the  number  of  hands  cut  from  the  dead,  only  83  being  recorded 
among  the  spoil  from  Megiddo.^^  Although  this  figure  may  not  represent 
the  exact  number  of  the  slain,  it  is  evident  that  the  Asiatics  fled  after 
offering  very  little  resistance.  Why  they  did  so  is  not  plain.  They  prob- 
ably mustered  a  considerable  force  and  they  certainly  had  the  advan- 
tage of  position.  It  is  likely,  however,  that  they  had  been  hastily 
gathered  together,  many  undoubtedly  having  been  forced  into  the  coa- 
lition against  their  will,  as  was  sometimes  the  case  among  the  Syro- 
Palestinian  allies  in  the  later  period  of  the  Assyrian  invasions.  It  is  pos- 
sible that  the  Egyptian  force  proved  to  be  larger  than  the  Asiatics  had 
expected  to  encounter.  Moreover,  the  seat  of  the  rebellion  was  in  the 
north,  and  many  of  the  Allies  must  have  felt  themselves  far  away 
from  their  home  land  and  have  lost  interest  in  the  conflict  as  they  ad- 
vanced towards  the  south.  Perhaps  the  fact  that  the  Pharaoh  had   out- 

86.  Only  once  more,  on  his  last  campaign,  does  Thutmose  record  tlie  number  of  hands 
taken  from  the  slain,  tbev  then  amounting  to  only  29  (^Urk.  IV,  731).  These  figures  from 
Thutmose's  campaigns  are  the  smallest,  as  far  as  I  know,  of  any  in  the  Egyptian  royal  annals. 
The  number  of  liands  recorded  as  taken  from  the  slam  in  battle  increase  with  the  later  inscrip- 
tions. In  the  time  of  the  great  war  that  Merneptah  waged  with  the  Lybians  and  their  allies  from 
among  the  northern  invaders,  we  find  at  least  3,410  hands  taken  (Breasted,  Ancient  Records, 
III,  588),  while  in  Ramses  Ill's  Lybian  campaigns  the  figures  run  into  the  twelve  thousands 
(Breasted,  op.  cit.  IV,  54).  Either  the  earlier  wars  were  fought  with  far  less  numerous  foes 
than  in  the  time  of  the  great  invasions  of  the  XIX  and  XX  Dynasties,  or  the  later  accounts  are 
greatly  exaggerated,  or  the  custom  of  cutting  c.fF  the  hands  of  the  slain  was  much  more  com- 
monly practised  in  later  times  than  under  the  XVIII  Dynasty,  with  whom  the  custom  makes 
its  first  appearance. 


54  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 

manoeuvred  them  would  have  upset  any  previously  laid  plans  of  the 
Allies.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  reason,  the  Asiatics  fell  back  be- 
fore the  Egyptian  advance  and  their  rout  was  immediately  complete. 

The  situation  at  the  Battle  of  Megiddo  was  not  unlike  that  which 
subsequently  developed  in  the  course  of  the  action  at  Kadesh  between 
Ramses  II  and  the  Hittites.^'  In  the  latter  case  the  Egyptian  camp  lay 
along  the  bank  of  the  Orontes  and  the  Hittites,  in  attacking  the  camp, 
threw  out  their  wings  to  either  side  and  inclosed  the  Egyptian  army, 
driving  it  back  towards  the  river.  In  the  battle  of  Megiddo  the  Egyp- 
tian army  threw  out  its  wings  and  inclosed  the  Asiatic  army,  driving 
it  back  through  its  camp  to  the  city  of  Megiddo  behind.  At  Kadesh  the 
utter  destruction  of  the  Egyptian  force  was  prevented  by  the  fact  that 
the  Hittites  stopped  to  plunder  the  Egyptian  camp.  The  same  event  in 
the  battle  of  Megiddo  prevented  the  total  destruction  of  the  Allies.  As 
Thutmose's  army  closed  in  on  the  Asiatic  forces,  the  Egyptians  in  pur- 
suing the  fleeing  foe,  found  it  necessary  to  pass  through  the  enemy's 
camp,  and  the  rich  plunder  that  lay  everywhere  around  proved  too 
much  for  their  discipline.  Forgetting  the  routed  Asiatics,  the  Pharaoh's 
army  set  to  looting  the  captured  camp,  thus  affording  the  enemy  the 
opportunity  to  effect  their  entrance  into  Megiddo  or  to  flee  to  the  north 
across  the  plain  of  Esdrselon.  What  might,  therefore,  have  proved  the 
total  annihilation  of  the  Asiatics,  was  turned  into  a  mere  defeat,  though 
a  severe  one,  and  Thutmose  found  that  the  cupidity  of  his  troops  was  to 
cost  him  still  further  efforts. 

When  the  Asiatics  turned  to  flee  before  the  Egyptian  onset,  they 
found  themselves  confronted  with  a  most  dangerous  situation.  The  in- 
habitants of  the  city,  who  must  have  been  intently  watching  the  strug- 
gle from  the  top  of  the  wall,  when  once  the  magnitude  of  the  disaster 
which  had  befallen  their  arms  became  apparent,  lost  all  thought  for  the 
safety  of  the  survivors  and  shut  the  gates  of  Megiddo  in  the  faces  of  their 
troops  fleeing  to  the  city  for  safety.  Few,  if  any,  of  the  chariots  of  the 
Allies  were  saved.  Had  the  conflict  taken  place  in  the  open  plain,  many 
of  the  Asiatics  could  have  made  use  of  their  chariots  in  effecting  their 
escape  across  the  plain.  That,  however,  was  impossible  in  the  situation 
in  which  they  found   themselves.    On  the  west,  south,   and   southwest 

87     Breasted,  Battle  of  Kadesh,  p.    34. 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  55 

were  the  advancing  Egyptians,  while  to  the  north  lay  the  city,  its  gates 
shut  against  friend  and  foe  alike.  Escape,  except  over  the  city  wall, 
was  possible  only  to  the  northeast,  and  to  flee  in  that  direction  it  was 
necessary  for  them  to  cross  their  camp  and  descend  the  steep  sides  of 
the  mound  G  on  the  northeast,  a  decline  too  precipitate  for  horse 
and  chariot,  even  had  they  been  able  to  make  their  way  through  the 
debris  scattered  about  the  camp.  As  a  result  of  this  unforseen  situation, 
the  Asiatics  "abandoned  their  horses  and  their  chariots  of  gold  and  of 
silver"  and  took  to  their  heels  for  safety.  This  fact  probably  accounts 
for  the  large  number  of  horses  and  chariots  mentioned  above  as  enu- 
merated among  the  spoil  of  Megiddo.  Many  of  the  Allies  must  have  es- 
caped northward  into  the  plain  of  Esdraelon  and  beyond,  especially 
when  they  found  the  city  gates  closed  against  them.  When  once  they 
had  reached  the  plain,  they  would  have  been  safe,  for  the  Egyptians,  as 
we  saw,  had  abandoned  the  pursuit  for  the  lure  of  plunder.  Those  who 
turned  towards  the  city,  among  which  number  were  the  kings  of  Kadesh 
and  Megiddo,  were  drawn  up  into  the  city  by  the  inhabitants.  The  glacis, 
extending  along  the  base  of  the  wall,  allowed  the  fugitives  to  get  near 
enough  to  the  top  of  the  wall  so  that  the  inhabitants,  by  lowering  the 
long  girdles  from  their  waists,  could  pull  them  up  to  the  top.  The 
Egyptian  sense  of  humor  is  evident  in  the  relish  with  which  the  Annalist 
describes  the  undignified  escape  of  the  kings,  dangling  at  the  ends  of  the 
lowered  garments.  Had  the  Egyptians  pursued  the  Asiatics,  they  would 
undoubtedly  have  been  able  to  inflict  great  loss  upon  the  mass  of  dis- 
organized fugitives,  struggling  for  an  opportunity  to  climb  into  the  city. 
The  absorption  of  the  victors  in  the  plundering  of  the  camp  could  not 
be  better  illustrated  than  by  the  fact  that  the  enemy  were  allowed  the 
time  necessary  to  effect  their  escape  in  this  cumbersome  fashion.  It  is  like- 
ly that  the  royal  fugitives  did  not  long  remain  within  the  walls,  for 
when  Megiddo  finally  surrendered  after  a  siege,  they  were  not  among 
the  prisoners.  Probably  seeing  the  hopelessness  of  the  situation,  they 
lingered  in  the  city  only  long  enough  to  gather  a  few  followers,  and 
then  escaped  by  the  northern  gate,  still  surviving,**^  just  above  the 
terrace-like  projection  on  the  north  of  the  Tell. 

Meanwhile   the  Egyptian    army    was   gathering  in  a   rich  harvest   of 

88.    Schumacher,     Tell  el-Mutesdlim,  II,  plate  a. 


56  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 

spoil.  Besides  the  chariots  already  spoken  of,  the  hands  cut  from  the 
bodies  of  the  few  Asiatics  who  had  fallen  in  battle,  totaling  only  83,  were 
gathered  together  as  evidence  of  victory.  Many  of  the  enemy  must  have 
been  made  captive  in  the  confusion  of  the  rout  and  these  too  counted  as 
spoil.  One  of  the  most  conspicuous  prizes,  however,  was  the  tent  of  the 
king  of  Kadesh,  a  sumptuous  affair,  supported  by  seven  poles  and  work- 
ed, probably,  with  silver.  It  undoubtedly  contained  handsome  furniture, 
a  prize  for  that  time  as  notable  as  was,  at  a  later  day,  the  famous  tent 
of  Darius  captured  by  Alexander,  the  Great.  All  this  booty  seems  to 
have  been  gathered  together  before  the  king.  A  large  share  of  the  spoil 
was  made  over  to  the  treasury  of  Anion.  Much  must  have  gone  to  re- 
plenish the  royal  coffers.  Some  of  it  undoubtedly  was  given  as  rewards 
to  those  members  of  the  army  who  had  distinguished  themselves  in  the 
engagement. 

At  this  point  an  interesting  supplement  to  the  Annals  is  furnished  by 
the  biography  of  Amenemheb,  one  of  Thutmose's  genecals,  who  accom- 
panied the  king  on  many  of  his  campaigns,  though  whether  he  was  pre- 
sent at  Megiddo  is  uncertain.  In  relating  his  part  in  Thutmose's  cam- 
paigns in  Syria,  he  says  : 

When  his  Majesty  cams  to  Nahirin,  I  brought  off  three  msn  from  the  fight 
there  ;  I  set  them  before  thy  Majestv    as  living  prisoners."   "Again  I  toiighton 

that  expedition  in  the  land  of  Carchemish.     I    brought  off as  living 

prisoners.  I  set  them  before  mv  lord.  He  rewarded  me  with  a  great  reward." 
Again  I  beheld  his  victory  in  the  countrv  of  Takhsi,  the  wretched,  in  the   city 

of  Mero I  brought  off  Asiatics,   3  men,    as   living  prisoners.    Then 

my  lord  gave  to  me  the  gold  of  honor;  list  thereof:  2  flies,  a  lion,  a  female  slave 
and  a  male  slave. "^^ 

The  larger  objects  of  spoil  were  thus  brought  up  before  the  king,  who 
undoubtedly  indicated  the  share  belonging  to  Amon,  that  des-gned  for 
the  royal  treasury,  and  that  to  be  divided  among  the  army.  In  the  days 
of  Ahmose  I  it  Wc\s  the  duty  of  the  royal  herald  to  present  to  the  sover- 
eign those  of  his  coinmanders  who  had  a  claim  on  the  royal  favor  be- 
cause of  conspicuous  valor.^o  We  may  picture  to  ourselves  a  scene  of  bar- 
baric splendor  as  the  Pharaoh  sat  enthroned  upon  the  battlefield,  sur- 
rounded by  his  officers  and  troops,  while  Intef,  the  herald,^'  brought  be- 

89.  Breasted,  Ancient    Records,   II,   581   fF. 

90.  Breasted,  op.  lit.  II,  9,   11. 

91.  Breasted,  o/>.  cit.  II,  767  fF. 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  57 

fore  the  king,  one  by  one,  the  candidates  for  the  sovereign's  rewards.  And 
much  of  the  praise  that  the  army  is  said  to  have  given  to  the  king  prob- 
ably arose  from  the  acclamations  of  the  soldiery  as  to  one  after  an- 
other of  their  favorite  officers  Thutmose  distributed  the  marks  of  his  favor. 
We  cannot  suppose,  however,  that  much  time  was  consumed  in  this 
wise.  Thutmose  realized  that  his  work  was  only  half  done  while  Megid- 
do itself  remained  in  the  enemy's  hands.  He  therefore  urged  on  his 
army  to  continue  the  successful  efforts  they  had  begun,  adding:  "Behold, 
[every  land]  is  given  [to  ray  Majesty  according  to  the  command]  of  Re 
this  day;  for  every  chief  of  every  northern  country  which  has  revolted  is 
within  it;  for  it  is  the  capture  of  a  thousand  cities,  the  capture  of  Me- 
giddo." But  apparently  the  great  opportunity  had  been  lost.  The  delay 
occasioned  by  the  plundering  of  the  camp  had  been  sufficient  to  allow  the 
leaders  of  the  Allies  to  escape,  and  when  finally  the  city  fell,  "every 
chiefs  of  every  northern  country"  was  no  longer  within  it. 


58  The  Battle  of  Megtddo 


V 


THE     SIEGE    OF    MEGIDDO 


THE    ANNALS,    LINES    90-98 

Behold, (91) [officers]  of  the  nuiff    to 

hasten [to  cause  that]  every  [man  should  know]  his  posi- 
tion. They  measured  [this]  city,  inclosing  it  with  an  earth- 
work, fenced  about  with  the  green  wood  of  all  their  pleasant 

Urk.  661  trees,  while   his  Majesty  himself  was  upon  the  fortress,  south 

of  this  city,  watching  (92)  [upon  it  day  and  night.]  

inclosed with  a  thick   wall with 

its  thick  wall.  The  name  was  called  "Menkheperre-is-the-en- 
snarer-of-the-Asiatics".  People  were  appointed  to  watch  at 
the  tent  of  his  Majesty,  to  whom  was  said,  "Steadfast!  Stead- 
fast!   Watchful!    watchful!"  [Now]   his   Majesty    (93) 

[It  was  not  pei-mitted  that]  one  of  them  [go  out]  to  the  out- 
side upon  the  back  of  this  wall  except  to  go  out  to  knock  (?)  at 
the  door  of  their  fortress. 

Now  everything  that  his  Majesty  did  to  this  city  and  to  this 
wretched  enemy  together  with  his  wretched  army  was  record- 
ed on  the  day  by  its  name,  by  the   name  of  the  voyage,  by  Ibe 

Urk.  662  name  of  the  officers  of  the  (94)  rnnft 

They  were   recorded    upon  a  roll  of  leather  in  the   temi)!(' 

of  Amon  on  this  day. 

Now  the  chiefs  of  this  country  came  upon  their  bellies  to  kiss 
the  earth  because  of  the  might  of  his  Majesty;  to  beg  the 
breath  for  their  nostrels,  because  great  was  his  power  and  be- 
cause .great  was  the  might  of  Amon  over  [every]  foreign  coun- 
try. All  the  chiefs  were  brought  because  of  the  might  of  his 
Majesty,  bearing  their  tribute  of  silver,  gold,  lapis-lazuli,  mal- 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  59 

akite,  and  carrying  in  clean  grain,  wine,  cattle,  small  cattle,  for 
the  army  of  his  Majesty. 

Urk,  663    One  gang  of  them  was   bearing   tribute  southward.     Then 

his  Majesty  appointed  anew  the  chiefs  of  (96)  [every  city] 

Megiddo:  340  living 

captives,  83  hands,    2,041   mares,    191  female  colts,  6  stallions, 

male   colts,  1    chariot    worked  with  gold,  its  [pole]  of 

gold,  belonging   to   that  foe;  [one]  beautiful   chariot   wrought 
with  gold  belonging  to  the  chief  of  (97)  [Megiddo.] 

Urk.  664 892  chariots  of  his  wretched  army:  total  924.     1  beautiful 

bronze  suit  of  armor  of  that  foe;  one  beautiful  bronze  suit  of 

armor  of  the  chief  of  Megiddo;  200 suits  of  armor  of  his 

wretched  army,  502  bows,  7  poles  of  mery- wood  wrought  with 
silver  of  the  tent  of  that  foe. 

Now  the  army  [of  his  Majesty]   seized  (98) 

387 ,   1,929  cattle,   2,000   small    cattle,   20,500 

small  white  cattle. 

Apparently  no  effort  was  made  to  take  the  city  by  storm.  Just  why 
Thutmose  did  not  make  such  an  attempt  at  once  is  hard  to  surmise.  We 
know  from  the  results  of  the  excavations  at  Megiddo  that  the  place  was 
strongly  fortified,  but  brick  walls,  even  of  the  strongest,  were  no  deterrent 
to  the  king  on  his  later  campaigns  when  he  breached  the  walls  of 
Kadesh,  a  much  more  formidable  fortress  than  Megiddo.^2  n  jg  possible 
that  he  realized  what  was  apparently  the  real  situation  in  the  city, 
namely,  that  no  preparation  had  been  made  to  resist  a  long  siege,  and 
he  may  therefore  have  decided  to  let  hunger  fight  for  him,  rather  than 
risk  the  chance  of  a  repulse  if  he  attempted  to  take  the  place  by  storm. 
He  therefore  issued  the  necessary  orders  and  the  preparations  for  the 
siege  began. 

The  details  of  the  methods  pursued  by  the  Egyptians  in  the  siege  are, 
like  the  details  of  the  battle,  very  obscure.  The  Annals  state  that  "they 
measured  this  city,  inclosing  it  with  an  earthwork,  fenced  about  with 
the  green  wood  of  all  their  pleasant  trees,  while  his  Majesty  himself 
was  upon  the  fortress  east  of  the  city,  watching  [upon  it  day  and  night.] 

92.    Breasted,  Ancient  RecorJi,   II,    590.   , 


60  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 

inclosed with   a   thick  wall with  its   th'.ck 

wall.  Its  name  was  called,  'Menkheperre-is-the-ensnarer-of-the-Asia- 

tics'.  It  was  not  permitted  that  one  of  them  go  out  to  the  outside  upon 

the  back  of  this  wall   except  to  go   out  to  knock  at  the  door  of  their  in- 

closure."  In  the  account  of  the   feasts  and  offerings  instituted   by    the 

king  on   his   return   from  this  campaign,  Thutmose  says  that  he   made 

these  offerings  "when  my  Majesty  returned  from  the  land  of  Retenu   on 

the  occasion  of  the  first  victories  which  my  father  Amon  gave  to  me  in 

his  giving  to  me  every  land  of  Zahi,  assembled  and  shut  up  in  one  city, 

********I  ensnared   them  in  one  city.     I  built  upon  them  with 

a  thick  wall  to of  the  breath  of  life,   by  the  favor  of  my 

father  Amon."^^  Another  fragment   containing  an  account  of  the   first 

campaign  preserves  the  meagre  statement:  "Majesty  surrounded  it  with 

a  wall,  made  thick Not  did  they  breathe    the    breath 

of  life,  being  surrounded  in  front  of  their  wall."^* 

Before   making   any  suggestions  in  regard  to  the  method   pursued  by 

the  Egyptians  in  constructing  this  wall,  I  should  like  to  quote  a  passage 

from  Thucydides'  account  of  the   siege   of  Plataea  by   the  Peloponne- 

sians.  The  narrative  runs; 

"In  the  first  place  the  soldiers  felled  the  fruit-trees  and  surrounded  the  city 
with  a  stockade,  that  henceforth  no  one  might  get  out.  "Fhey  then  began  to 
raise  a  mound  against  it,  thinking  that  with  so  large  an  amy  at  work  this  would 
be  the  speediest  way  of  taking  the  place.  So  they  cut  timber  from  Cythaeron 
and  built  on  either  side  of  the  intended  mound  a  frame  of  logs  placed  crosswise 
in  order  that  the  material  might  not  scatter.  Thither  they  carried  wood,  stones, 
earth  and  anything  which  would  fill  up  the  vacent  space,  a.  *  *  *  *  The 
Peloponnesians,  having  failed  in  this,  as  in  their  former  attempt,  surrounded 
Platasa  with  a  wall.  Trenches  out  of  which  they  took  clay  for  the  bricks  were 
formed  both  on  the  inner  and  outer  side  of  the  w;i]l."35 

Taking  this  passage  from  Thucydides  in  conjunction  with  the  account 
in  the  Annals  it  would  seem  most  likely  that  Thutmose  first  marked 
out,  or  "measured",  a  line  of  circumvallation  along  which  edrth works 
were  to  be  thrown  up.  It  is  possible  that  the  timbers  used  in  "fencing-m" 
the  city  were  employed,  as  at  Plataea,  to  strengthen  the  earthworks, 
forming  a  sort  of  framework  in  which  to  pack  the  e.irth  and  stones.  The 

93.  Breasted,  op.  cit.   6 1 6. 

94.  Breasted,  op.    cit.  440. 

95.  Thucydides  (Jowett's  translation),   II,   75-78. 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  61 

trees^s  may,  on  the  other  hand,  have  been  used,  as  Maspero  suggests,^'' 
to  form  a  sort  of  stockade  or  palisade,  which  could  be  easily  and  quickly 
erected  to  assist  in  shutting  up  the  city  until  the  heavier  rampart  of 
earth  could  be  thrown  up.  Earthworks  about  two  miles  long  would  ef- 
fectively inclose  the  Tell.  At  least  one  tower  or  bastion  was  raised  upon 
the  wall,  though  it  is  not  at  all  unlikely  that  such  towers  were  located 
at  intervals  along  the  entire  line  of  siege  works.  The  one  tower  men- 
tioned in  the  Annals  stood  on  the  east  of  the  city.  Here  the  king  made 
his  headquarters,  directing  the  troops  from  this  advantageous  posi- 
tion where  the  widest  outlook  over  the  operations  could  be  secured. 

This  method  of  conducting  a  siege  by  walling  in  a  town  was  in  use 
throughout  antiquity.  An  interesting  parallel  is  recorded  on  the  north- 
Syrian  stela  of  Zakir,  king  of  Hamath,  dating  from  the  eighth  century 
B.  C.98  Zakir  relates  how  Bar-Hadad,  son  of  Hazael,  king  of  Aram,  assem- 
bled seven  kings  against  him: 

'•All  these  kings  erected  entrenchments  against  Haz[rak.]  They  threw  up  a 
wall  higher  than  the  wall  ot  Hazrak  and  exxavated  a  moat  deeper  than  [its  moat.]  " 

The  rampart  that  Thutmose  erected  around  Megiddo  could  hardly  have 
been  as  high  as  the  wills  of  the  city  except  on  the  south,  owing  to  the 
fact  that  the  city  stood  on  a  natural  elevation  from  the  base  of  which 
the  land  slopes  away  on  the  west,  north  and  east.  Moreover,  as  the 
Egyptians  do  not  seem  to  have  done  more  than  starve  the  city  into  sub- 
mission, it  was  not  necessary  to  raise  the  ramparts  high  enough  to  over- 
look the  city. 

The  sources  omit  all  mention  of  any  encounter  between  the  Egyptians 
and  the  Asiatics  during  the  siege.  That  such  conflicts  occurred  we  may 
feel  certain,  and  in  the  biography  of  Amenemheb  we  have  a  suggestion 
of  the  many  stirring  events,  the  details  of  the  story  that  the  Annals  give 
only  in  outline.  As  the  siege  progressed,  the  supplies  in  the  city  ran  short. 

96.  To-d,iy  the  region  around  the  Tell  is  utterly  destitute  of'  trees.  In  Thutmose's  day, 
however,  it  was  probablv  heavily  wooded.  On  the  south  side  of  the  Carmel  Ridge  are  still  the 
remains  of  the  great  forest  for  which  this  region  was  once  famous  (Josephus,  JVars,  XIII,  2. 
Strabo,  XVI,  26).  Possibly  this  forest  extended  over  t>  the  Esdra?lon  side  of  the  Ridge  and  afford- 
ed Thutmose  the  trees  needed  for  his  siege-works  However,  the  term  "pleasant  (lit. sweet) 
tre^s"  used  in  the  Annals  would  seem  to  refer  rather  to  fruit  trees,  such  as  the  olive,  than  to 
ordinary  forest  timbt-r.  In  the  Middle  Ages  there  were  many  fine  gardens  in  and  about  the  plain 
aniH  the  same  may  have  been  true  even  at  this  early  date.  The  Papyrus  Anastasi  I,  referred  to 
earlier,  would  also  indicate  that  the  district  was  well  wooded. 

97.  Maspero,  Struggle  of  the  Nations,  p.   258. 

98.  Pognon,   Inscriptions  Stmitifues,  p.    173. 


62  The  Battle  of  Megiddo 

Megiddo  was  well  supplied  with  water,  to  be  sure,  from  'A^n  el-Kubbi 
at  the  northern  base  of  the  Tell.  Schumacher  has  demonstrated  that 
this  spring  is  an  artificial  source,  the  water  being  brought  down  in  an 
underground  channel  from  'Ain  es-Sitt.99  It  is  also  highly  pro])abl('  that 
there  existed  some  connection  with  this  channel  within  the  city  itself  as 
the  excavations  at  other  Palestinian  sites  have  shown  to  have  been  cus- 
tomary. It  was  lack  of  food  rather  than  of  water  that  probably  caused 
the  surrender  of  the  city.  The  Annals  state  that  the  Egyptians  did  not 
allow  any  of  the  Asiatics  to  "go  out  to  the  outside  upon  the  back  of  this 
wall  except  to  go  out  to  knock  (?)  at  the  door  of  their  inclosure."  This 
statement  can  only  mean  that  none  of  the  inhabitants  of  Megiddo  were 
allowed  to  leave  the  city  unless  they  came  out  to  surrender  to  the 
Egyptians.  In  this  way  the  siege  continued  until  famine,  most  probab- 
ly, forced  the  inhabitants  to  surrender. 

The  siege  had  begun  on  May  15th.  The  next  date  in  the  campaign 
that  we  are  able  to  fix  is  not  later  than  October  11th,  at  which  time 
Thutmose  was  in  Thebes  celebrating  a  feast  of  victory.  In  the  interval 
occurred  the  siege,  a  march  to  southern  Lebanon  where  three  cities 
were  captured  and  a  fortress  of  some  kind  was  constructed,  and  the  re-- 
turn  to  Egypt.  The  operations  subsequent  to  the  fall  of  Megiddo  could 
not  well  have  been  carried  out  in  less  than  three  months  and  probably 
consumed  even  more  time.  If,  as  seems  evident,  Megiddo  was  unprepar- 
ed for  a  siege,  a  month  would  be  ample  for  the  interval  between  the 
commencement  of  the  work  on  the  inclosing  rampart  and  the  surrender 
of  the  place.  But  this  again,  like  so  much  connected  with  the  battle,  is 
at  best  conjecture. 

The  fall  of  the  city  carried  with  it  the  submission  of  the  other  towns 
and  villages  in  the  region  around  Megiddo.  Being  the  most  commanding 
fortress  between  Jezreel  and  the  coast,  it  must  have  exercised  control 
over  an  extensive  territory,  the  inhabitants  of  which  naturally  looke  1 
to  Megiddo  as  their  protector  and  their  place  of  refuge  in  time  of  danger. 
It  is  not  at  all  unlikely  that  the  leisurely  march  of  the  Egyptic\ns  from 
Gaza  to  Yehem  had  seen  the  submission  of  many  of  the  towns  and 
strongholds  in  the  south.  If  they  had  joined  in  the  revolt  the  dec'sion 
of  the  Allies  to  make  their  stand  at   Megiddo  must  have  loft  tlie   state 

99.    Schumacher,   Tell  el-Mutesellim,  I,  p.i6o. 


The  Battle  of  Megiddo  63 

to  the  south  defenceless  before  the  Egyptian  advance.  With  the  fall  of 
Megiddo  the  towns  in  northern  Palestine  would  undoubtedly  have  seen 
the  uselessness  of  further  resistance  and  would  have  hastened  to  make 
their  submission.  The  Annals  tell  us  that  "the  chiefs  of  the  country 
were  coming  upon  their  bellies  to  kiss  the  earth  because  of  the  might  of 
his  Majesty,  to  crave  breath  for  their  nostrils,  because  great  was  his 
power  and  because  great  was  the  might  of  Amon  over  every  country. 
All  the  chiefs  were  brought  because  of  the  might  of  his  Majesty,  bearing 
their  tribute." 

The  importance  of  the  fall  of  Megiddo  cannot  be  overestimated.  It 
crushed  once  for  all  the  rebellion  in  the  south.  In  the  subsequent  cam- 
paigns we  have  no  reference  to  any  serious  trouble  south  of  the  district  of 
Nuges  and  the  southern  Lebanon.  This  overwhelming  defeat  of  the  Allies 
just  at  the  beginning  of  their  rebellion  served  largely  to  break  up 
the  alliance,  and  the  later  campiagns  of  Thutmose  were  almost  en- 
tirely against  a  succession  of  isolated  powers.  Only  in  the  extreme  north, 
in  Naharin  and  the  Orontes  valley,  was  any  united  effort  made  to  stem 
the  tide  of  Egyptian  advance.  A  coalition  of  all  Syria-Palestine  was 
made  impossible  by  the  crushing  blow  that  the  Allies  had  received  at 
the  very  beginning  of  the  movement.  It  gave  the  Pharaoh  the  prestige 
gained  from  success  in  the  initial  battle  of  the  war,  and  to  a  great  extent 
paved  the  way  for  his  subsequent  victories  in  the  north.  Since  the 
fall  of  Sharuhen,  after  a  three  years'  siege  by  Ahmose  I  a  century  earli- 
er, it  was  the  most  important  single  step  towards  the  final  conquest  of 
the  country  by  Egypt.  It  was  a  fitting  introduction  to  the  wars  of  the 
greatest  conqueror  the  world  had  then  seen.  That  it  made  a  lasting 
impression  on  the  people  of  the  time  is  evident  from  the  many  references 
to  the  battle  as  well  as  from  the  fact  that  the  Annals  devote  almost 
as  much  space  to  this  first  campaign  as  to  all  the  succeeding  ones  put 
together.  It  is  the  first  battle  in  history  in  which  we  can  in  any  meas- 
ure study  the  disposition  of  troops  and  as  such  forms  the  starting  point 
for  the  history  of  military  science. 


View  III. — Looking  southwest  along  the  Aruna  Road  from  a  point  about  a 
mile  above  the  northern  opening  of  the  valley. 


View  IV. — Looking  southwest  along  the  Aruna  Road  about  a  quarter  of  a 
mile  above  the  northern  opening  of  the  valley. 


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View  X. — Wady  es-Sitt 


View  XI. — The  Wady  of  the  Kina,  showing  the  deep  trench  the  brook  has  cut 
across  the  plain. 


View  XII.— Profile  of  east  slope  of  Tell  el-Mufesellini  where  Megiddo  stood 


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